
CBAM Ukraine exposure reaches $4.7 billion in projected export losses between 2026 and 2030 on a GMK Center estimate of March 2025, of which $3.3 billion is iron and steel, a sector that war has already cut far below its pre-2022 capacity.
The trade behind that projection is measured separately: the EU imported €3.41 billion of CBAM-covered goods from Ukraine in 2025 (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026).
What makes Ukraine's position unlike that of any other exporting country is a regulatory paradox: as an EU accession candidate, Ukraine may eventually join the EU Emissions Trading System, at which point CBAM would no longer apply to Ukrainian exports at all.
The short-term burden of CBAM compliance and the long-term promise of ETS membership pull in opposite directions. This article maps Ukraine's CBAM-exposed sectors, quantifies the financial stakes, and explains why EU accession status changes the strategic calculation entirely.
What Is Ukraine's CBAM Exposure?
Ukraine's CBAM exposure is concentrated in iron and steel, and the dependence runs both ways: the EU took 81% of Ukraine's exports of finished steel products in the first ten months of 2025, according to GMK Center, a Kyiv-based metals and mining research institute.
In estimates updated in March 2025 on 2024 export data, GMK Center put CBAM-related investment losses for Ukraine at $2.7 billion between 2026 and 2030 and export losses at more than $4.7 billion over the same five years, $3.3 billion of it in iron and steel. These are projections of lost exports and investment, not a measure of trade.
The trade itself is measured by Eurostat. The EU imported €3.41 billion of CBAM-covered goods (Annex I codes) from Ukraine in 2025, against €2.98 billion in 2023 and €3.35 billion in 2024 (Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026).
That made Ukraine the eleventh-largest origin by value and, because iron ore and cement are heavy, the third-largest by weight at 11.13 million tonnes.
Ukraine's pre-war steel industry was built around blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) production, the most carbon-intensive route in steelmaking.
The Ukraine table in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621, as replaced by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1740, sets default values of 2.397 tonnes of CO2e per tonne for semi-finished steel (CN 7207 11 14) and 2.483 for hot-rolled flat products (CN 7208), both on the blast furnace route.
At the official Q3 2026 certificate price of €82.32, published October 5, 2026, that is €197.32 and €204.40 per tonne before the free allocation adjustment.
The EU carbon border adjustment mechanism under Regulation (EU) 2023/956 prices those embedded emissions through a certificate system linked to the EU ETS, meaning EU importers of Ukrainian steel must purchase EU carbon border adjustment mechanism certificates proportional to the carbon content of their imports.
The EU imported 4.25 million tonnes of CBAM-covered iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 from Ukraine in 2025, worth €2.45 billion, up from 3.40 million tonnes in 2024 and 2.85 million in 2023 (Eurostat Comext, 2025).
From 2034 no CBAM factor applies, so the whole of the embedded emissions is charged. On the semi-finished steel default with the 30% mark-up (3.1161 tonnes of CO2e per tonne), that is €256.52 per tonne at a constant €82.32, before any change in the certificate price.
Ukraine's CBAM-Exposed Sectors: Trade Volumes and Financial Stakes
The main CBAM-covered goods the EU imports from Ukraine are steel products, agglomerated iron ore, pig iron, cement and electricity. The first table gives the 2025 trade and the second the cost per tonne.
| CBAM-covered goods from Ukraine, 2025 | Quantity | Value | Share of extra-EU imports by quantity | Rank by quantity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 | 4.25 million tonnes | €2.45 billion | 7.4% | 4 |
| of which finished steel products of Chapter 72 | 2.35 million tonnes | €1.33 billion | 7.5% | 6 |
| of which crude and semi-finished steel | 990 thousand tonnes | €446.3 million | 9.7% | 3 |
| of which pig iron (CN 7201) | 567 thousand tonnes | €209.1 million | 22.6% | 2 |
| Agglomerated iron ore (CN 2601 12 00) | 4.93 million tonnes | €582.5 million | 26.8% | 2 |
| Cement and clinker | 1.89 million tonnes | €159.6 million | 13.3% | 2 |
| Aluminium | 38 thousand tonnes | €96.0 million | 0.4% | 30 |
| Electricity | 1.51 TWh | €117.8 million | 1.7% | 8 |
Source: Eurostat Comext DS-045409, EU27 imports from Ukraine, Annex I codes, 2025, extracted October 12, 2026. These are trade statistics, not CBAM declarations.
The table below shows what an EU importer owes per tonne on Ukraine's default values at the official Q3 2026 certificate price of €82.32, for 2026 imports and for 2030 imports at the same price.
| Good (CN code) | Default value (tCO2e/t) | Default plus 2026 mark-up | Benchmark | Certificates per tonne, 2026 | Cost per tonne, 2026 at €82.32 | Cost per tonne, 2030 at €82.32 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Semi-finished steel (CN 7207 11 14) | 2.397 | 2.6367 | 1.364 | 1.3068 | €107.58 | €198.69 |
| Hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) | 2.483 | 2.7313 | 1.370 | 1.39555 | €114.88 | €207.64 |
| Bars and rods (CN 7213 and CN 7214 20 00) | 2.397 | 2.6367 | 1.364 | 1.3068 | €107.58 | €198.69 |
| Pig iron (CN 7201) | 2.173 | 2.3903 | 1.210 | 1.21055 | €99.65 | €181.25 |
| Grey Portland cement (CN 2523 29 00) | 1.380 | 1.518 | 0.666 | 0.86865 | €71.51 | €119.45 |
Default values: Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621 as replaced by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1740, Ukraine table, total emissions (direct emissions only for steel and pig iron; the cement value includes an indirect component). Mark-up: 10% for 2026, 30% for 2030. Benchmarks: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2620, point 5.3, Column B, on the blast furnace route that the Ukrainian steel rows indicate. Certificates = default plus mark-up minus CBAM factor (97.5% for 2026, 51.5% for 2030) × cross-sectoral correction factor (100%) × benchmark. The 2030 column holds the price and the benchmark constant; updated benchmarks are foreseen for goods imported from 2027.
Electricity (CN 2716 00 00), exported through the ENTSO-E interconnectors, is charged per MWh on its full embedded emissions: the free allocation adjustment for electricity is zero (Article 1(2) of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2620).
Ukraine was the second-largest origin of EU cement and clinker imports in 2025, behind Türkiye: 1.89 million tonnes, 13.3% of extra-EU imports by quantity, up from 1.17 million tonnes in 2023 (Eurostat Comext, 2025). By value, at €159.6 million, cement is small beside steel, which dominates the exposure by a wide margin.
The net CBAM cost in 2026 is lower than the cost before the free allocation adjustment, but it is not small.
The adjustment per tonne is the CBAM factor (97.5% in 2026, the share of free allocation retained) × the cross-sectoral correction factor × the benchmark, so only a good exactly at its benchmark pays for 2.5% of its emissions. For semi-finished steel on default values the 2026 cost is €107.58 per tonne.
On the same default, benchmark and price the cost is €198.69 per tonne for 2030 imports, when the mark-up is 30% and the CBAM factor 51.5%.
Ukrainian steelmakers and their EU buyers face a material cost from the first year and a further sharp rise in the 2029 to 2030 period, when free allocation drops most steeply.

Text version of this infographic
- €3.41 billion: EU imports of CBAM-covered goods from Ukraine, 2025 (11.13 million tonnes. Trade statistics, not CBAM declarations)
- 11th: largest non-EU origin by value (3rd by quantity, of all non-EU origins)
What the EU imports most from Ukraine
- Iron ore pellets and sinter, 2601 12 00: 4,929
- Grey Portland cement, 2523 29 00: 1,640
- Hot-rolled flat steel, 7208: 1,309
- Semi-finished steel, 7207: 967
- Pig iron, 7201: 567
Thousand tonnes in 2025, by CN code. Highlighted: the worked example below.
What one tonne costs in 2026
Semi-finished steel, CN 7207 11 14 (Imported from Ukraine in 2026, on the default value. Figures in tCO₂e per tonne)
- Default value, Ukraine table: 2.397
- Plus 10% mark-up for 2026: 2.6367
- Minus free allocation adjustment (97.5% × benchmark 1.364): −1.3299
- Certificates per tonne: 1.3068
Cost per tonne at the Q3 2026 price of €82.32: €107.58
The old shortcut, 2.5% of gross, says €5.43. It is wrong: the deduction stops at the benchmark, and everything above it is paid in full.
Ukraine has its own default values. The Ukraine table in Annex I has a value for each of the five goods above, so the “Other countries and territories” defaults do not apply to them.
No exemption, no deduction. No CBAM exemption exists for Ukraine, and its carbon tax of UAH 30 per tonne CO₂ (about €0.60) is not recognised under Article 9 (as of October 23, 2026).
How War Has Reshaped Ukraine's CBAM Exposure
Ukraine's CBAM steel exposure is inseparable from the economic consequences of Russia's 2022 invasion. The GMK Center study flagged the risk of closure for 3 out of Ukraine's 7 remaining blast furnaces under combined war damage and CBAM cost pressure, with potential job losses exceeding 13,000 workers in the steel sector.
Metinvest and ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih, the 2 dominant Ukrainian steel producers, have both operated well below pre-war capacity throughout 2023 and 2024 as energy disruption, supply chain severance, and physical destruction of plant infrastructure reduced output.
The war context matters for CBAM exposure in 3 specific ways.
First, reduced output means the absolute CBAM cost burden is lower than pre-war projections indicated, since fewer tonnes shipped means fewer certificates.
The EU-bound volume has nonetheless been rising: EU imports of Ukrainian CBAM-covered iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 went from 2.85 million tonnes in 2023 to 4.25 million tonnes in 2025 (Eurostat Comext, 2025).
Second, reconstruction would add to that volume. As Ukraine rebuilds, steel output is expected to recover, and EU-bound exports are likely to increase further. The CBAM cost environment will be significantly worse at the point of reconstruction than it was before the war, because the free allocation phase-out will be further advanced.
Third, the infrastructure damage has pushed Ukrainian steel production toward electric arc furnace (EAF) routes in some facilities where blast furnaces are inoperable. EAF steel carries an emission factor of approximately 0.5 tonnes of CO2 per tonne, less than one quarter of the BF-BOF factor.
That reduces the CBAM cost per tonne only where verified actual emissions are declared, because Ukraine's default values for carbon steel assume the blast furnace route.
Article 9: Does Ukraine Qualify for a Carbon Price Deduction?
Ukraine taxes CO₂ from stationary sources at UAH 30 per tonne, but that tax does not support an Article 9 deduction under Regulation (EU) 2023/956: it is not recognized, it is too small to matter, and no third-country carbon price is recognized as of October 12, 2026.
Article 9 allows EU importers to claim a reduction in the certificates to be surrendered for a carbon price paid in the country of origin, but only where that price has been effectively paid for the declared embedded emissions, with any rebate or other compensation taken into account (Article 9(1)), and where the documentation is certified by an independent person (Article 9(2)).
The European Commission published a draft implementing regulation on how such deductions are assessed on 13 May 2026, setting out four recognition pathways (emissions trading systems, point-source carbon taxes, fuel-based carbon taxes, and mixed-compliance systems); the public consultation closed 10 June 2026 and the regulation had not been adopted as of October 12, 2026.
This framework will govern any future Ukrainian deduction claim once Ukrainian producers effectively pay a carbon price, but it does not itself create a deduction pathway for Ukraine today.
Ukraine has levied a carbon tax on CO₂ emissions from stationary sources since its Tax Code took effect in 2011.
The rate has been UAH 30 per tonne since January 1, 2022 (Tax Code, Article 243.4), about €0.60 at the National Bank of Ukraine rate of October 12, 2026, less than 1% of the Q3 2026 certificate price. It is not recognized under Article 9.
Ukraine is developing an emissions trading system as part of its EU accession commitments under the Association Agreement.
The International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP) lists it as "under development" as of October 12, 2026: a government action plan approved in February 2025 puts the first operational phase in 2028, and a draft ETS law was released for consultation in June 2026.
Until a recognized scheme operates and producers effectively pay a meaningful carbon price under it, EU importers of Ukrainian goods have next to nothing to deduct under Article 9.
The legislative path to that ETS fragmented in mid-August 2026. According to reporting by EcoPolitic and Carbon Pulse on 17 August 2026, four competing draft laws on Ukraine's national emissions trading system (NETS) are now in circulation: the government's own draft plus three Verkhovna Rada drafts, No. 15386 of 7 July, No. 15386-1 of 21 July, and No. 15386-2 of 23 July.
The drafts differ on who manages the carbon market, where the revenues go, which sectors are covered, and how free allocation is handled. Draft 15386-2 has already been presented to parliamentary committees, amid complaints from the European Business Association that it was advanced without stakeholder consultation.
The Article 9 stakes are direct: until Ukraine enacts and operates a single ETS that the Commission can assess as a qualifying scheme, no deduction pathway opens for EU importers of Ukrainian goods, and four competing legislative texts push that assessment further out. The fragmentation is covered in the report on Ukraine's four competing ETS draft laws.
The Commission's December 2025 Article 30 review of CBAM considered but did not grant Ukraine a specific CBAM exemption, citing limited aggregate economic impact.
Ukrainian industry stakeholders and the Ukrainian government have contested this framing, noting that the aggregate assessment obscures the concentrated exposure of a country whose export structure is dominated by a single CBAM sector.
The EU Accession Complication: Inside the ETS, Not Outside CBAM
Ukraine's status as an EU accession candidate creates a regulatory complication that no other major CBAM-exposed exporting country faces. The complication is this: if Ukraine accedes to the EU and joins the EU ETS, CBAM would no longer apply to Ukrainian exports at all.
CBAM exists to prevent carbon leakage when goods move from jurisdictions without carbon pricing into the EU single market. An EU member state, or a country with a linked ETS equivalent to the EU ETS, falls outside CBAM's scope by definition.
The practical timeline creates a genuine strategic dilemma. The EU accession process is projected to take between 7 and 15 years under current conditions, depending on the pace of legal alignment and political agreement across EU member states.
In the interim, Ukraine faces a CBAM cost escalation that peaks in severity precisely during the 2028 to 2034 period when free allocations phase out most aggressively. The heaviest financial burden arrives well before any accession scenario could provide relief.
Three implications follow from this dual timeline.
First, Ukrainian steel producers face a window of CBAM exposure that increases annually from 2026, with the sharpest cost increases occurring between 2029 and 2030. Planning investment in decarbonization must account for this peak exposure even if eventual ETS integration provides a long-run escape from CBAM costs.
Second, the development of a Ukrainian domestic ETS, which is required for EU accession alignment, will itself generate compliance costs for Ukrainian steel producers. ETS membership means paying a domestic carbon price on production, not just absorbing the commercial pressure of CBAM on EU buyers. The cost trajectory is upward regardless of the path.
Third, there is a transitional arrangement question that remains unresolved as of October 12, 2026. Whether Ukraine qualifies for transitional provisions or phased arrangements during the accession period that might reduce or defer CBAM costs has not been formally addressed in Commission guidance.
The EU has precedent for managing accession-phase regulatory alignment through transitional derogations, but no specific CBAM transitional framework for Ukraine exists in current legislation.
The Commission's parallel work defining how Article 9 carbon-price deductions will be assessed, published in draft form in May 2026 and still not adopted as of October 12, 2026, likewise has not addressed accession-candidate transitional treatment specifically.
The Exemption Debate: From Lamy's Intervention to Industry Appeals
The case for a Ukraine-specific CBAM exemption gained its most prominent advocate to date in July 2026.
Pascal Lamy, the former EU trade commissioner and now a supervisory board member at Ukrainian energy company DTEK, said in a Contexte interview given on 22 July 2026 and widely reported on 29 July that Ukraine should be exempted from CBAM, with the exemption conditioned on decarbonisation milestones linked to Ukraine's EU accession process.
Lamy's proposal is a policy recommendation from a former official, not a legislative initiative; no EU institution has taken it up as of August 5, 2026. The full intervention and its context are covered in the report on Lamy's call for a Ukraine CBAM exemption.
The trade data underlying the exemption argument has deteriorated sharply. GMK Center data for the first half of 2026 shows Ukrainian exports of long-rolled products down 41.7% year on year and exports of flat-rolled products down 8.1%, while imports of long products into Ukraine rose 64% as Turkish and Chinese suppliers gained ground in the domestic market.
GMK Center estimates that CBAM alone will reduce Ukraine's ferrous steel exports by $400 to $450 million in 2026, and forecasts Ukrainian steel production of 6.5 million tonnes for the year. On the electricity side, research by Bruegel, the Brussels-based economics think tank, suggests CBAM could cut Ukrainian electricity exports by more than 60%.
The institutional record continues to point in the opposite direction. The Commission refused force-majeure relief for Ukraine in December 2025, and the European Parliament's ENVI committee position adopted on 6 July 2026 contained no Ukraine exemption.
The full Parliament confirmed that line on 15 September 2026, adopting its first-reading negotiating mandate on the CBAM scope expansion by 464 votes to 50 with 159 abstentions: the adopted mandate contains no Ukraine carve-out, leaving the exemption demand without a legislative vehicle.
The first trilogue on October 20, 2026 ended without an overall agreement (press reports), no position includes a Ukraine carve-out, and a second trilogue is reported for November 30, 2026.
The pressure from Ukrainian industry has since intensified. GMK Center reported on 14 August 2026, citing Reuters and Metinvest chief operating officer Oleksandr Myronenko, that Ukrainian steelmakers face a squeeze from two directions at once: EU import quotas restricting volumes and CBAM costs eroding the margins on the volumes that remain.
The same reporting describes a 30% rise in rail tariffs compounding the cost pressure, alongside a strike-related suspension of production at Zaporizhstal and a possible pivot to pig iron output at roughly 50% of capacity.
Against this backdrop, Ukrmetallurgprom and the Federation of Employers of Ukraine have formally urged Kyiv to seek exemptions from the EU, moving the exemption question from external advocacy to a formal domestic industry demand. The appeals and the trade data behind them are covered in the report on Ukraine's steel quota and CBAM exemption appeals.
GMK Center analysis puts a price on the squeeze at plant level: ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih has recorded approximately 300,000 tonnes of cancelled orders, with CBAM costs running at USD 60 to 90 per tonne.
The warning escalated on 22 September 2026 from export loss to import dependence. Oleksandr Vodoviz, head of the CEO's office at Metinvest, said, as reported by SteelOrbis, that declining domestic steel production could make Ukraine increasingly dependent on steel imports from Turkey and South Korea, suppliers he said can offer more competitive prices than EU mills.
The statement came with Zaporizhstal idled after repeated missile strikes and Kametstal suspending production following an attack on 5 September 2026.
Metinvest has also suspended its European expansion plans: the group had been prepared to invest approximately EUR 200 million in Poland's Huta Częstochowa but did not proceed with the acquisition, and potential opportunities such as one in Košice, Slovakia, are no longer an immediate priority, with the group focused on maintaining existing operations against production costs up roughly 30% year on year.
Metinvest again requested temporary relief from CBAM in the same statement, arguing that Ukrainian steelmakers lack the financial resources for decarbonisation investment while their facilities remain exposed to military attack.
A country whose CBAM debate has been about defending export volumes now faces the prospect of flipping to net steel imports, which would shrink the very export base the exemption argument is built on.
GMK Center modelling now extends the squeeze to the end of the decade. Under the combination of CBAM cost escalation and the EU's new steel safeguard quotas, which cap Ukraine's tariff-quota exports at roughly 1.05 million tonnes per year, on average about 60% below actual 2025 volumes of some 2.65 million tonnes, GMK Center forecasts a possible complete halt of Ukrainian long-product and square billet exports to the EU by 2030, and puts cumulative CBAM payments on Ukrainian iron and steel exports at roughly EUR 1.2 billion over 2026 to 2030.
These figures are GMK Center estimates for the product categories under the quotas. They are not official EU projections and are not comparable with the Eurostat import figures above.
Organized labour has joined the exemption push: the PMGU, Ukraine's trade union of metallurgists and miners, has demanded solutions on CBAM exemptions for Ukraine in letters to Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, other state bodies, and the EU Ambassador to Ukraine, warning of job losses at ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih and social risks across the industrial regions.
Lamy returned to the question on 24 September 2026 with a sharpened design. As reported by SteelOrbis, he proposed that a Ukraine CBAM exemption be made conditional on the country's progress toward EU membership, on commitments to align its climate policy with EU standards as part of the accession process, and on the establishment of an operational Ukrainian emissions trading system meeting EU specifications.
The structure matches his July intervention: relief in exchange for verifiable decarbonisation and accession progress, not a blanket carve-out that would invite copycat claims from other exporters.
On 25 September 2026 the factual backdrop changed again. ArcelorMittal announced that it is unable to safely and sustainably restart operations at ArcelorMittal Kryvyi Rih after four missile strikes in five weeks, the most recent on 21 September 2026, which killed five workers and injured 17.
The group is taking a non-cash impairment charge of approximately $1 billion and says it will focus on preserving the plant's infrastructure while discussing its future with the Government of Ukraine, with no restart timeline given. It is the third halt at a major Ukrainian integrated plant in a single month, after Kametstal and Zaporizhstal.
Ukraine's formal CBAM relief request runs in parallel: government-level negotiations with the European Commission and repeated appeals under the force-majeure clause of Article 30(7) of Regulation (EU) 2023/956, a route the Commission refused in December 2025 and for which no single dated filing has been made public.
The announcement, the state of the relief request and Lamy's September proposal are covered in the report on ArcelorMittal's shutdown and Ukraine's CBAM relief push.
Whether Lamy's accession-linked conditionality model, or the broader exemption demand now formalized by Ukrainian industry and its trade unions, gains traction in the trilogue phase remains, as of October 12, 2026, an open question.
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How Does Ukraine Compare to Other CBAM-Exposed Steel Exporters?
Ukraine was the fourth-largest origin of CBAM-covered iron and steel goods imported into the EU in 2025 by quantity, after China, Türkiye and Russia, and the eighth-largest by value (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, Annex I goods of Chapters 72 and 73, extracted October 12, 2026).
Understanding its position requires comparing it to countries with different carbon pricing arrangements and different strategic relationships with the EU.
Ukraine vs. Turkey: Larger Trade, Different Legal Relationship
The EU imported €10.83 billion of CBAM-covered goods from Türkiye in 2025, about three times the €3.41 billion from Ukraine, with iron and steel goods the largest sector for both (Eurostat Comext, 2025).
Turkey enacted its first Climate Law in July 2025 and published its Emissions Trading System Regulation on August 27, 2026, but the 2026 to 2027 pilot allocates 100% of allowances for free, so no carbon price is effectively paid as of October 12, 2026.
Turkey's Customs Union relationship with the EU generates a separate legal dispute about whether CBAM discriminates against Turkish goods, but this argument has not produced a formal WTO challenge. Ukraine, by contrast, faces CBAM exposure from a position of political alignment with the EU rather than commercial tension.
Ukraine vs. India: Similar Steel Tonnage, Different Position
India is an origin of similar size for steel: the EU imported 4.01 million tonnes and €4.39 billion of CBAM-covered iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 from India in 2025, against 4.25 million tonnes and €2.45 billion from Ukraine (Eurostat Comext, 2025).
India has filed no WTO dispute against CBAM as of October 12, 2026, though it reserved third-party rights in DS639, Russia's case. Ukraine has not challenged CBAM either: its government has asked the Commission for relief under the force-majeure clause of Article 30(7), as described above, not for a ruling against the mechanism.
Ukraine vs. South Korea: The Article 9 Difference
South Korea operates the K-ETS (Korea Emissions Trading Scheme), active since 2015 and the longest-running scheme among major steel exporters.
It is not recognized under Article 9 as of October 12, 2026, and the International Carbon Action Partnership reports that steel continues to receive 100% free allocation in Phase 4 (2026 to 2030), so the price effectively paid can be far below the market price of approximately $6 to $7 per tonne of CO2.
EU importers of Ukrainian steel and of South Korean steel are therefore in the same legal position today: neither can claim a deduction. The difference is that Korean mills hold a decade of compliance records to draw on once the implementing rules are adopted, while Ukraine has no scheme in operation.
What Steps Can Ukrainian Exporters Take Now?
Non-EU exporters under CBAM have no direct legal obligation under Regulation (EU) 2023/956. The legal obligation falls on the EU importer. However, Ukrainian steel producers can take 4 practical steps to reduce the commercial pressure CBAM places on their EU buyers.
- Measure and verify actual embedded emissions per production installation to replace punitive default values. The default mark-up for steel is 10% above the calculated default in 2026, rising to 30% from 2028 onward. Where actual emissions are below the default, verified data reduces the CBAM cost per tonne directly.
- Engage EU buyers early on CBAM cost allocation, negotiating whether the certificate cost is absorbed by the importer, shared, or reflected in adjusted contract pricing.
- Monitor the Ukrainian ETS development timeline and the Commission's assessment process for Article 9 qualification, as recognition would enable a partial deduction once an effective carbon price is established.
- Track the accession negotiation timeline and any transitional CBAM provisions that may emerge in future Commission proposals or accession package legislation.
For a full explanation of how the certificate obligation works from the EU importer's side, including how embedded emissions are calculated and declared, see the guide to CBAM for non-EU exporters.
Is Ukraine Exempt from CBAM?
Ukraine is not exempt from CBAM as of October 12, 2026. The only countries exempt from CBAM under Regulation (EU) 2023/956 are EEA members (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein) and Switzerland, which operates a linked ETS. Ukraine's EU candidate status does not confer a CBAM exemption. The European Commission's December 2025 review explicitly considered and rejected a specific exemption for Ukraine, citing limited aggregate economic impact, a finding that Ukrainian industry stakeholders dispute given Ukraine's concentrated steel export dependency.
Former EU trade commissioner Pascal Lamy called in July 2026 for a Ukraine exemption conditioned on decarbonisation milestones linked to EU accession, and repeated the proposal on 24 September 2026, but it remains a proposal: the first-reading negotiating mandate the full European Parliament adopted on 15 September 2026 contains no Ukraine carve-out.
Does Ukraine's CBAM Exposure Include Electricity?
Yes. Ukraine's electricity grid synchronized with ENTSO-E in March 2022 and Ukraine exports electricity to the EU via interconnectors. Electricity (CN 2716 00 00) is a CBAM good, and because its free allocation adjustment is zero, certificates are owed on the full embedded emissions per MWh. Article 2(7) of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 allows an exemption for a third country whose electricity market is coupled with the EU's, once the Commission has assessed that six conditions are met, and the country is then listed in Annex III, point 2.
That list is empty in the consolidated Regulation of October 20, 2025, and no exemption for Ukraine exists as of October 12, 2026. The EU imported 1.51 TWh of electricity from Ukraine in 2025, worth €117.8 million (Eurostat Comext, extracted October 12, 2026), against €2.45 billion of iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73.
Will CBAM Apply to Ukraine After EU Accession?
CBAM will not apply to Ukrainian exports to the EU after Ukraine's accession, provided Ukraine has joined the EU ETS as part of accession. EU member states are part of the internal market and the ETS; goods produced within the EU are not subject to CBAM, which applies only to imports from third countries. The practical question is timing: EU accession for Ukraine is projected to take between 7 and 15 years under current conditions, meaning CBAM will apply through the period of steepest cost escalation, 2026 to 2034, before any accession-based relief is possible.
What Are CBAM Certificates and Who Buys Them for Ukrainian Steel?
CBAM certificates are instruments purchased by the authorized EU importer, not by the Ukrainian exporter. The EU importer of Ukrainian steel must register as an authorized CBAM declarant, calculate the embedded emissions of the steel based on verified data or default values, and surrender CBAM certificates for those emissions less the free allocation adjustment.
For 2026 imports the certificate price is the quarterly average of EU ETS auction closing prices for the quarter of import (Article 21(1a)); the official Q3 2026 price is €82.32, published October 5, 2026. From 2027 the price is a weekly average (Article 21(1)). Certificate sales begin on February 1, 2027, under Article 20(1) as amended by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083. The first annual CBAM declaration covering calendar year 2026 is due by September 30, 2027. For a detailed explanation of how CBAM certificates work, including the purchase, holding, and surrender cycle, see the certificates guide.
How Does CBAM Affect the CBAM Russia and Ukraine Comparison?
Russia and Ukraine occupy opposite ends of the CBAM geopolitical spectrum. CBAM Russia requested WTO consultations in dispute DS639 on May 12, 2025, the only formal CBAM WTO challenge globally, arguing CBAM violates GATT trade discrimination rules and that EU ETS free allocation constitutes a prohibited subsidy; a panel was established on September 25, 2026. Ukraine views CBAM compliance as a path toward EU integration.
The trade is of comparable size. The EU imported €4.89 billion of CBAM-covered goods from Russia in 2025, down from €5.92 billion in 2023, and €3.41 billion from Ukraine, up from €2.98 billion (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026). Russia's is mostly semi-finished steel (3.87 million tonnes) and fertilizers (4.92 million tonnes). The strategic postures, legal arguments, and financial trajectories of the two countries under CBAM are entirely distinct.