
US exporters shipping steel, aluminium, and chemicals to the EU carry 100% of their CBAM certificate obligation with no offset available, because the United States has no federal carbon pricing scheme that qualifies under Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956.
The 2026 obligation is not a flat 2.5% of embedded emissions: every tonne of CO₂e above the CBAM benchmark is charged in full, and the free allocation adjustment shrinks as the CBAM factor falls from 97.5% in 2026 to 51.5% in 2030 and to nothing from 2034.
US exporters and their EU customers who treat 2026 as a preview of long-term costs are making a serious planning error. This article explains the current CBAM exposure for US-origin goods, the Article 9 gap, the political context, and the four actions US exporters can take before costs become structural.
What Is CBAM and Why Does It Apply to US Exports?
CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) is a certificate-based regulatory system established by Regulation (EU) 2023/956 that requires EU importers of carbon-intensive goods to purchase certificates proportional to the embedded CO₂ emissions of their imports, priced at the EU ETS carbon price, in order to prevent carbon leakage from the EU Emissions Trading System.
The definitive phase of CBAM began January 1, 2026. CBAM is not a tariff, not a carbon tax, and not a customs duty. It is a certificate obligation that falls on EU importers, but its costs transmit commercially to non-EU exporters through price negotiations and supplier switching.
The United States was the ninth-largest origin of CBAM-covered goods imported into the EU in 2025, at €3.90 billion or 3.5% of extra-EU imports by value (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026).
For the purposes of the EU CBAM guide, the US position is distinct: unlike South Korea, which operates the K-ETS (not recognized under Article 9 as of October 12, 2026, as no third-country carbon price is), and unlike Switzerland, which is exempt through its linked ETS, the US has no federal carbon price that could support a deduction against CBAM liability.
State-level programs exist. California's Cap-and-Invest Program and Washington's Cap-and-Invest Program cover industry, at average 2025 auction prices of USD 28.14 and USD 60.95 per tonne, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative covers power generators in ten states of the US Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, according to the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP).
None is recognized under Article 9 as of October 12, 2026, and each reaches only installations in the states concerned.
Which US Exports Are Subject to CBAM?
Three product categories from the United States fall within CBAM's Annex I scope: steel and steel articles under Chapters 72 and 73, aluminium and aluminium articles under Chapter 76, and selected chemicals including ammonia and hydrogen under Chapters 28 and 31. The table below shows what an EU importer owes per tonne of US-origin goods on default values at the official Q3 2026 certificate price of €82.32 per tonne CO₂e, published October 5, 2026.
Six goods from the United States table of default values are shown, for 2026 imports and for 2030 imports at the same price.
Direct reduced iron (CN 7203) leads the table because it is the iron and steel good the United States actually ships: 494 thousand tonnes in 2025, worth €171.6 million, 21.8% of extra-EU imports and the third-largest origin.
Hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) was 2 thousand tonnes; it stays in the table as the reference product for the mill comparison below (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026).
| Good (CN code) | Default value (tCO₂e/t) | Default plus 2026 mark-up | Benchmark | Certificates per tonne, 2026 | Cost per tonne, 2026 at €82.32 | Cost per tonne, 2030 at €82.32 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Direct reduced iron (CN 7203) | 0.450 | 0.495 | 0.397 | 0.10792 | €8.88 | €31.33 |
| Hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) | 1.400 | 1.540 | 1.370 | 0.20425 | €16.81 | €91.74 |
| Unwrought aluminium (CN 7601) | 1.700 | 1.870 | 1.423 | 0.482575 | €39.73 | €121.60 |
| Urea (CN 3102 10 19) | 2.290 | 2.3129 | 0.902 | 1.43345 | €118.00 | €152.16 |
| Anhydrous ammonia (CN 2814 10 00) | 3.410 | 3.4441 | 1.522 | 1.96015 | €161.36 | €218.99 |
| Hydrogen (CN 2804 10 00) | 26.640 | 29.304 | 5.089 | 24.342225 | €2,003.85 | €2,635.16 |
Default values: Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621 as replaced by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1740, United States table, total emissions (direct emissions only for steel, aluminium and hydrogen; fertilizer values include an indirect component). Mark-up: 10% for 2026 and 30% for 2030; fertilizers 1% in every year. Benchmarks: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2620, point 5.3, Column B, on the blast furnace route for hot-rolled flat steel and the primary route for aluminium that the United States rows indicate; direct reduced iron has a single benchmark. The 2030 column holds the price and the benchmark constant; updated benchmarks are foreseen for goods imported from 2027.
The number of certificates per tonne is the embedded emissions minus the free allocation adjustment, never less than zero.
The adjustment is the CBAM factor × the cross-sectoral correction factor (100% for 2026 to 2030) × the CBAM benchmark, and the CBAM factor is the share of free allocation retained: 97.5% in 2026 and 51.5% in 2030 (Directive 2003/87/EC, Article 10a(1a)).
For US direct reduced iron the steps are: 0.450 × 1.10 = 0.495 tCO₂e per tonne; adjustment 0.975 × 0.397 = 0.38708; certificates 0.10792; cost €8.88 per tonne.
The same product costs €31.33 per tonne for 2030 imports at the same price, three and a half times as much, driven by the mark-up and the free allocation schedule and not by any change in ETS price. For hot-rolled flat steel the same steps give €16.81 and €91.74.
The CBAM steel sector guide contains full CN code lists, benchmark emission factors, and calculation mechanics for US-origin steel products entering the EU.

Text version of this infographic
- €3.90 billion: EU imports of CBAM-covered goods from the United States, 2025 (3.04 million tonnes. Trade statistics, not CBAM declarations)
- 9th: largest non-EU origin by value (14th by quantity, of all non-EU origins)
What the EU imports most from the United States
- Iron ore pellets and sinter, 2601 12 00: 1,405
- Direct reduced iron, 7203: 494
- UAN solution, 3102 80: 491
- Ammonia, 2814: 298
- Other steel articles, 7326: 33
Thousand tonnes in 2025, by CN code. Highlighted: the worked example below.
What one tonne costs in 2026
Direct reduced iron, CN 7203 (Imported from the United States in 2026, on the default value. Figures in tCO₂e per tonne)
- Default value, United States table: 0.450
- Plus 10% mark-up for 2026: 0.495
- Minus free allocation adjustment (97.5% × benchmark 0.397): −0.387075
- Certificates per tonne: 0.107925
Cost per tonne at the Q3 2026 price of €82.32: €8.88
The old shortcut, 2.5% of gross, says €1.02. It is wrong: the deduction stops at the benchmark, and everything above it is paid in full.
The United States has its own default values. The United States table in Annex I has a value for each of the five goods above, so the “Other countries and territories” defaults do not apply to them.
No deduction. The United States has no federal carbon price, and no state programme is recognised under Article 9 (as of October 23, 2026).
Why US Exporters Cannot Use the Article 9 Deduction
Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 allows EU importers to deduct a carbon price "effectively paid" in the country of origin when calculating their CBAM certificate obligation.
A reduction can be claimed only for a carbon price effectively paid for the declared embedded emissions, with any rebate or other compensation taken into account (Article 9(1)), and the documentation must be certified by an independent person (Article 9(2)).
The United States has nothing to claim at the federal level. No federal carbon pricing mechanism exists. The Clean Competition Act and the Foreign Pollution Fee Act (FPFA) were introduced in the 119th Congress but neither has moved beyond committee referral as of October 12, 2026.
California's Cap-and-Invest Program applies to electricity generators and large industrial facilities in that state, and the RGGI covers only power sector emitters in ten states of the US Northeast and Mid-Atlantic.
Article 3(29) of the Regulation defines a carbon price as an amount paid in a third country under a carbon emissions reduction scheme, and it does not exclude a state-level scheme. No carbon price of any kind is recognized as of October 12, 2026, however, and the implementing rules are still a draft.
US exporters whose EU customers would otherwise benefit from an Article 9 deduction currently receive zero offset against their CBAM certificate obligation.
The deduction for non-EU exporters without a qualifying carbon price reads as follows from the CBAM Article 9 deduction page: the deductible amount is zero when no effective carbon price exists in the country of production.
For comparison, four countries that do have a national carbon price or a linked system are listed below. No carbon price from any of them is recognized under Article 9 as of October 12, 2026.
- South Korea (K-ETS active since 2015, covering 77.75% of national emissions in 2023 according to the International Carbon Action Partnership; not recognized)
- Switzerland (linked ETS, fully exempt from CBAM, zero certificate obligation)
- United Kingdom (UK ETS active but not exempt and not recognized; POLITICO reported on October 7, 2026 that negotiators had agreed a UK-EU ETS link, which neither side had confirmed by October 12, 2026)
- Japan (GX-ETS mandatory since April 2026; not recognized)
The US sits in a category distinct from all four: it has no federal mechanism of any type to assess for Article 9, regardless of maturity or current price level. For more information on how other non-EU countries are positioned, the CBAM for non-EU exporters overview covers the full exporter framework.
What the US Government Has Done About CBAM
The US government has not filed a formal WTO challenge against CBAM. The only formal WTO challenge filed globally is DS639, in which Russia requested consultations on May 12, 2025 and a panel was established on September 25, 2026.
The United States reserved third-party rights in that case, as did 26 other WTO members (WTO case page, read October 12, 2026), but it has initiated no dispute of its own.
The US political position on CBAM has been split along partisan lines. The Biden administration supported CBAM as consistent with US climate goals and IRA climate investments. The argument advanced by the Biden-era US Trade Representative was that the Inflation Reduction Act's clean energy subsidies serve an equivalent decarbonization function.
The European Commission formally rejected this equivalency argument: IRA subsidies reduce emissions domestically but do not constitute a carbon price "effectively paid" at the production installation level as required under Article 9.
The Trump-era and current Republican position opposes CBAM as a trade barrier, with Senators Cassidy and Graham proposing the FPFA as a parallel mechanism.
In the EU-US Joint Statement on a Framework Agreement of August 21, 2025, the Commission committed "to work to provide additional flexibilities in the CBAM implementation", taking note of US concerns about small and medium-sized businesses. The statement exempts no US goods.
The rhetorical conflict escalated sharply in August 2026. On 12 August, Andrew Puzder, the US ambassador to the EU, published an op-ed in the Financial Times calling CBAM "a tariff by a different name" and accusing the EU of applying a "double standard" to its trading partners.
The European Commission rebutted the charge on 13 August through spokesperson Louise Bogey, stating that CBAM is non-discriminatory and WTO-compatible and that the EU's regulatory autonomy is non-negotiable.
Euronews reported on 14 August that the dispute was widening beyond the initial exchange. The full sequence is covered in the report on the US ambassador's tariff charge and the EU rebuttal.
On October 8, 2026 the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) asked for public comments on the EU CBAM and on the three EU texts that would extend it to downstream goods (Federal Register document 2026-20615, docket USTR-2026-0661). Comments are due on November 9, 2026.
The notice is a request for comments, not an investigation or a trade measure: it cites no statute and announces no hearing. One of its four questions asks whether "enforcement action" may be appropriate, without defining the term. The report on the USTR comment docket sets out the questions and the filing rules.
Neither the August exchange nor the USTR notice changes the legal position. As of October 12, 2026, the US has still not filed a WTO dispute against CBAM, and the certificate obligation on EU importers of US-origin goods continues to apply unchanged.
US exporters cannot rely on any near-term diplomatic resolution to reduce their CBAM exposure. The WTO route is uncertain and slow, bilaterals have produced no binding outcomes, and no federal carbon pricing legislation is currently advancing through Congress. The exposure is structural and growing.
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How CBAM Costs Pass Through the Supply Chain
Non-EU manufacturers have no direct legal obligation under CBAM. The legal obligation falls entirely on the EU-based authorized declarant who imports the goods. However, this legal structure does not protect US exporters from commercial consequences.
EU importers who purchase US-origin steel, aluminium, or fertilizers face a CBAM certificate obligation calculated on the embedded emissions of those goods. Three commercial outcomes follow directly.
The three mechanisms through which CBAM costs reach US exporters are described below.
- Price renegotiation: EU importers reduce the price they offer US exporters to account for their certificate obligation. The US producer absorbs part or all of the CBAM cost as a lower FOB or CIF price.
- Supplier switching: EU importers shift sourcing to suppliers in lower-carbon-intensity countries or exempt countries (EEA, Switzerland). US exporters lose market share without any price negotiation occurring.
- Default value penalty: If US exporters cannot provide verified actual emissions data for their production installations, EU importers fall back to CBAM default values. A mark-up is added to the total-emissions default: 10% in 2026, rising to 20% in 2027 and 30% from 2028 onward (1% for fertilizers), per Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621 as replaced by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1740.
The default value mark-up is a compounding problem for US exporters who have not historically tracked production-level emissions data. For hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) the United States default is 1.400 tCO₂e per tonne, so the mark-up adds 0.140 in 2026, 0.280 in 2027 and 0.420 from 2028.
Each of those tonnes is charged at the full certificate price, because the benchmark of 1.370 carries no mark-up. Whether verified actual data lowers the bill depends on the mill: an importer should model both paths before choosing.
How Significant Is US Steel and Aluminium Export Exposure?
EU imports of CBAM-covered goods from the United States are modest beside those from China, Türkiye and India: €3.90 billion in 2025, against €17.09 billion, €10.83 billion and €5.30 billion (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, all Annex I goods, extracted October 12, 2026).
Iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 were 665 thousand tonnes and €2.71 billion, a high value per tonne that reflects steel articles of Chapter 73 (€1.93 billion). Aluminium was 47 thousand tonnes and €721.1 million. Fertilizers were 867 thousand tonnes and €308.6 million, including 298 thousand tonnes of ammonia.
Two flows sit at the extremes. The EU imported 1.40 million tonnes of agglomerated iron ore (CN 2601 12 00) from the United States in 2025, itself a CBAM good, and only €3.7 million of hydrogen, the good with the highest default value in the table above.
The de minimis threshold of 50 tonnes of net mass a year exempts small importers entirely.
For the rest, the Bipartisan Policy Center argued on January 8, 2026 that US producers risk being disadvantaged by the default values, writing that "The United States needs data of its own to best represent the interests of American businesses and ensure that American exports are subject to accurate emissions intensity estimates."
Mills operating modern electric arc furnace (EAF scrap) facilities have the most to gain from demonstrating verified actual emissions against defaults.
US EAF scrap-based steelmakers are among the world's lowest-carbon steel producers, with emission factors of approximately 0.5 tCO₂/t, compared with the United States default of 1.400 tCO₂e per tonne for hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208), or 1.540 with the 2026 mark-up.
A mini-mill with verified emissions of about 0.5 tCO₂e per tonne sits about 1.0 tCO₂e below the default with mark-up. The saving is that gap priced at the certificate price, adjusted for the different benchmark basis on actual values (the Column A process benchmark plus the adjustment embedded in precursors).
What US Exporters Should Do Before the 2030 Cost Cliff
On default values, US direct reduced iron costs €8.88 per tonne for 2026 imports and €31.33 for 2030 imports at a constant €82.32, and hot-rolled flat steel €16.81 and €91.74.
Over that period the CBAM factor falls from 97.5% to 51.5% and the default mark-up rises from 10% to 30%, a structural price signal that US exporters and their EU customers need to plan for now. The following section covers practical responses.
How Does Default Value Reporting Work for US Exporters?
Default values apply automatically when an EU importer cannot provide verified production-level emissions data from the exporting installation. The importer uses the United States table of default values in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621, as replaced by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1740. A mark-up is added to each value by design, to incentivize actual data submission: 10% in 2026, 20% in 2027 and 30% from 2028 onward (1% for fertilizers).
US producers who provide a third-party-verified emissions report to their EU customer allow the importer to use actual values instead of defaults. The verification must be conducted by an accredited verifier registered in the CBAM Registry, and only national accreditation bodies of EU Member States accredit CBAM verifiers. As of November 12, 2026, seven verification bodies are documented as accredited by five national accreditation bodies (ESYD in Greece, Accredia in Italy, Swedac in Sweden, RvA in the Netherlands and BELAC in Belgium), and the Commission's official list of accredited verifiers is still unpublished. The reporting period covers the calendar year 2026, with the first CBAM declaration due September 30, 2027.
US exporters who want to help EU customers avoid default-value penalties can engage a verifier now. The CBAM default values page explains how default values are calculated by sector and production route.
Is the US ETS Trajectory Likely to Change Before 2030?
No federal carbon pricing or carbon border legislation has advanced in the US Congress as of October 12, 2026. The Foreign Pollution Fee Act of 2025 (S.1325, introduced by Senator Cassidy with Senator Graham on April 8, 2025) and the Clean Competition Act (S.3523 and H.R.6787, introduced December 17, 2025) were each referred to committee on the day of introduction, and the official bill status records show no later action.
State programs continue to operate. California's Cap-and-Invest Program and Washington's Cap-and-Invest Program are in force and cover industry, and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative covers power generation in ten states, according to the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP). No carbon price of any country or state is recognized under Article 9 as of October 12, 2026, and a state program reaches only the installations in that state.
This site's assessment is that a federal carbon pricing scheme is very unlikely to be enacted, implemented, and recognized under Article 9 within the 2026–2030 window. US exporters should not build their CBAM compliance strategy around a federal carbon price emerging in time to reduce 2030 obligations.
Does the Global Arrangement on Steel and Aluminium Affect CBAM?
The Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminium (GASA) was a separate negotiating track from CBAM, and this site found no concluded GASA text as of October 12, 2026. A later EU-US text, the Joint Statement on a Framework Agreement of August 21, 2025, says of steel and aluminium that the two sides "intend to consider the possibility to cooperate on ring-fencing their respective domestic markets from overcapacity", including through tariff-rate quota solutions.
On CBAM the same statement says the Commission, taking note of US concerns about small and medium-sized businesses, "commits to work to provide additional flexibilities in the CBAM implementation", in addition to the increase of the de minimis exception. It exempts no US goods from CBAM. Commercial CBAM planning should proceed on the assumption that no EU-US arrangement reduces certificate obligations before 2030.
Can US Exporters Reduce Their EU Customers' CBAM Liability Without a Carbon Price?
Yes. Three mechanisms allow US exporters to help reduce EU importer certificate obligations without a qualifying federal carbon price being in place. These options are detailed in the CBAM exporter strategy guide.
The three available mechanisms for US exporters without a qualifying carbon price are listed below.
- Submit verified actual emissions data (replaces punitive default values with real production-level figures)
- Shift to lower-carbon production routes (EAF scrap production at ~0.5 tCO₂/t versus BF-BOF at ~2.0 tCO₂/t significantly reduces the certificate burden)
- Qualify individual installations under planned state programs (this does not create an Article 9 deduction but reduces actual emissions, lowering the certificate calculation base)
None of these options produces an Article 9 deduction. All three reduce the embedded emissions from which the free allocation adjustment is subtracted, and each tonne of CO₂e removed above the benchmark removes one certificate.
Is the WTO a Viable Route for US Exporters?
WTO challenges to CBAM are slow, uncertain, and currently limited to state-filed disputes, not individual company claims. Russia requested consultations in DS639 in May 2025, and the Dispute Settlement Body established a panel on September 25, 2026; a report is realistic in 2027 to 2028. The WTO Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019, so an appealed panel report could not be adopted. US companies have no standing to file a WTO dispute directly. Any US WTO challenge would require the US Trade Representative to file, and no formal filing has occurred.
US exporters who want to understand the broader WTO context for CBAM can read the WTO and CBAM analysis. Diplomatic engagement at the bilateral level is a parallel track but, as noted above, has not produced CBAM relief.
How Does the US Compare to China Under CBAM?
The US and China share the absence of a qualifying federal carbon price for Article 9 purposes, but their CBAM exposure profiles differ. China's national ETS, extended to steel, cement, and aluminium smelting under a March 2025 work plan, is intensity-based and allocates 100% of allowances for free; its average secondary-market price in 2025 was CNY 70.78 (USD 9.85), according to the International Carbon Action Partnership. It is not recognized under Article 9 as of October 12, 2026. The US has no equivalent mechanism under active development at the federal level.
The EU also imports far more from China: 9.07 million tonnes and €13.45 billion of CBAM-covered iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 in 2025, against 665 thousand tonnes and €2.71 billion from the United States (Eurostat Comext, 2025). The CBAM China analysis covers the China position in detail, including the default value differential that favors US producers: 1.400 tCO₂e per tonne for US hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) against 3.187 for China.
The comparison between the US and other key non-EU exporters on four critical dimensions is presented below.
| Country | Federal Carbon Price | Article 9 Deduction (October 12, 2026) | WTO Challenge Filed | Primary CBAM Sector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | None | Not recognized | No | Steel, aluminium |
| China | ETS (intensity-based, 100% free allocation, ~$9.85/tCO₂ average in 2025) | Not recognized | No | Steel, aluminium |
| South Korea | K-ETS (~$6–7/tCO₂; 100% free allocation for steel) | Not recognized | No | Steel |
| Russia | None effective | Not recognized | Yes (DS639) | Steel, fertilizers |
| India | CCTS (steel targets not notified as of February 2026) | Not recognized | No (formal) | Steel, aluminium |