
Non-EU exporters have 5 CBAM strategy options: provide verified actual emissions data, accept default values, decarbonize operations, redirect exports away from the EU, or pursue Article 9 recognition through a national carbon pricing scheme.
Non-EU exporters face 5 distinct CBAM strategy options, with the right choice depending on embedded emissions intensity, EU market dependence, and the timeline of cost escalation through 2034.
The financial pressure is real from 2026 for goods on default values: Turkish semi-finished steel (CN 7207 11 14) costs €99.70 per tonne in certificates for 2026 imports at the official Q3 2026 price of €82.32, and €189.38 for 2030 imports at the same price as free allocation phases out (on today's benchmark, which may be updated for goods imported from 2027 under recital 10 of IR (EU) 2025/2620).
Choosing the wrong CBAM strategy now creates a structural competitive disadvantage that compounds year over year.
The EU carbon border adjustment mechanism applies to six sectors: iron and steel, cement, aluminium, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen. For producers in any of these sectors exporting to EU buyers, the commercial mechanics are immediate.
EU importers must surrender certificates priced at the EU ETS rate (the official certificate price for Q3 2026 is €82.32 per tonne CO₂e), and they need verified embedded emissions data from the production installation to calculate that liability accurately.
This article evaluates all 5 strategic options available to CBAM for non-EU exporters and defines the decision criteria for each.
The 5 CBAM Strategy Options for Non-EU Exporters at a Glance
The 5 strategic responses available to non-EU exporters under Regulation (EU) 2023/956 differ in upfront cost, time horizon, financial outcome, and dependency on third parties. The table below compares all 5 options across the dimensions that matter most for planning:
| Option | Upfront Cost | Time to Implement | Best For | 2030 Cost Impact |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Provide actual emissions data | €5,000–€50,000 (verifier fee) | 6–18 months | Producers with actual emissions below default | Removes the default mark-up and the excess of the default over verified emissions, each tonne of CO₂e priced at the full certificate price |
| 2. Accept default values | Near-zero | Immediate | Low-EU-exposure producers in 2026 only | Default mark-up rises to +30% from 2028; growing cost pass-back |
| 3. Decarbonize operations | High (technology-dependent) | 3–10 years | High-volume EU exporters; sectors with clean alternatives | Reduces embedded emissions; lowers certificate liability permanently |
| 4. Redirect exports away from EU | Variable (market development cost) | 1–3 years | Producers with fungible product and alternative market access | Removes EU CBAM exposure entirely; window narrowing (UK CBAM starts January 2027) |
| 5. Pursue Article 9 recognition | Political and government-led | 2–5 years | Countries with operational carbon pricing (South Korea, South Africa) | Reduces the certificate obligation by the carbon price effectively paid, once recognised (no country as of October 12, 2026) |
The 5 options are not mutually exclusive. Producers in high-carbon sectors with significant EU exposure typically combine Option 1 (immediate data provision) with Option 3 (medium-term decarbonization) as a two-phase response.
Option 1: Provide Actual Emissions Data via the CBAM Operators Portal
Providing verified actual emissions data is the highest-leverage short-term CBAM strategy for most non-EU exporters whose actual production emissions fall below the CBAM default values. The default for Chinese steel slab (CN 7207 12 10) is 3.169 tCO₂e per tonne, or 3.4859 with the 10% mark-up for 2026.
After the free allocation adjustment of 0.975 × 1.364 = 1.3299, the importer owes 2.1560 certificates per tonne, or €177.48 per tonne at the official Q3 2026 price of €82.32.
Rough industry intensities of about 1.8–2.1 tCO₂e per tonne for a modern BF-BOF mill are context only, not a default value, a benchmark or a verified figure, so they are not priced here.
The saving from verified data depends on the installation's verified emissions and on the actual-value path, which deducts the Column A benchmark plus precursor free allocation. The importer passes any avoided cost back to the exporter as a price premium or retained contract.
The mechanism for data sharing is the CBAM Operators Portal, the O3CI section of the European Commission's CBAM Registry. Operators register, upload the emissions report for each installation, have it verified and disclose it to the EU-authorized CBAM declarants (importers) they supply. One upload serves all EU buyer relationships.
The data required is the operator's summary emissions report: 16 data points under point 1.2 of Annex IV to IR (EU) 2025/2547, covering the operator and installation (UN/LOCODE, coordinates to six decimals), production processes and routes, specific embedded emissions and free allocation per good, direct and indirect emissions, and precursors where they apply.
Evidence of a carbon price paid for an Article 9 deduction is documented separately. From 2026 onward, only the full EU calculation methodology is accepted. "Alternative methods" based on third-country standards that were permitted during the 2023–2025 transitional period are no longer valid.
Since August 14, 2026, operators no longer have to work from the legal texts alone.
The Commission published ten guidance documents for the definitive period on that date: Guidance No 2 is a quick guide written specifically for non-EU operators, Guidance No 3 covers the embedded-emissions calculation methods, and sector guides 5a to 5f give sector-specific monitoring and calculation instructions for the data operators must hand EU importers for the 2026 reporting year. The news report on the ten CBAM guidance documents covers the full series.
Verification is mandatory for actual values. A verifier accredited by the national accreditation body of an EU Member State under Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/2551, against EN ISO/IEC 17029:2019, must physically visit the production installation in the first year it is subject to verification.
Verification vendors quote fees of €5,000 to €50,000 per installation per reporting period, depending on complexity and geography. For CBAM data requirements for exporters, including the full specification of what each data point requires, producers should review the emissions report structure in Annex IV to IR (EU) 2025/2547, which replaced the optional Communication Template.
The default value mark-up structure penalizes non-reporting increasingly over time: +10% above the calculated default in 2026, +20% in 2027, and +30% from 2028 onward for steel, cement, aluminium and hydrogen; fertilizers carry 1% in every year.
For steel, cement, and aluminium producers with actual emissions meaningfully below the default, the data provision investment repays within a single export season.
Option 2: Accept Default Values (and Understand the Cost Premium)
Accepting default values is a viable CBAM strategy only for a specific type of exporter. The financial penalty for using defaults applies from 2026, because the mark-up and everything else above the benchmark are charged in full.
Grey Portland cement assessed at the "Other Countries and Territories" default of 1.440 tCO₂e per tonne (1.584 with the 2026 mark-up), the value that applies to Turkey, costs €76.94 per tonne for 2026 imports at €82.32 per tonne CO₂e.
Exporters with modest EU volumes (under 500 tonnes per year) will often accept the cost of defaults rather than invest in verification in year one.
The problem is that the cost keeps rising. For 2030 imports, with a 30% mark-up and a CBAM factor of 51.5%, the same cement costs €125.87 per tonne on default values at a constant €82.32, on today's benchmark, which may be updated for goods imported from 2027.
On a product with an FOB price of €60–80 per tonne, this is commercially unsustainable. EU buyers faced with two otherwise equivalent cement suppliers will consistently prefer the one whose actual data produces a lower certificate obligation.
The CBAM default values are published by the Commission under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621, as corrected by IR (EU) 2026/1740. Producers should check their sector-specific default before deciding to rely on it.
Where actual emissions are close to or above the default plus mark-up (less common but possible for older or coal-heavy production facilities), verified data brings little or no saving.
The two paths also deduct different benchmarks, Column B on default values and Column A plus precursor free allocation on actual values, so exporters should model both before choosing.
Exporters who choose to accept defaults in 2026 as a deliberate deferral strategy face 3 risks: growing cost pass-back from EU importers, loss of EU market share to lower-carbon competitors, and a harder verification task in 2027–2028 when they eventually must submit data with 2 years of back-records. Starting the monitoring process in 2026, even before formal verification, reduces that future burden.
Option 3: Decarbonize Operations to Reduce Embedded Emissions
Decarbonizing production is the only CBAM strategy that permanently reduces the embedded emissions liability rather than managing how it is reported or who bears it.
Decarbonization is a long-horizon CBAM strategy, typically requiring 3–10 years to implement at scale, but the compounding financial incentive is significant: every tonne of CO₂e removed from the production process reduces CBAM certificate obligations proportionally for the life of the mechanism.
The decarbonization pathways vary by sector. Steel producers face the clearest choice: transitioning from blast furnace (BF-BOF) production at approximately 2.0 tCO₂ per tonne to electric arc furnace (EAF) scrap-based production at approximately 0.5 tCO₂ per tonne, or direct reduced iron (DRI-EAF) routes at roughly 0.9–1.4 tCO₂ per tonne on natural gas, and far lower on green hydrogen (rough route intensities, not default values or benchmarks).
The EU imported 7.43 million tonnes of CBAM-covered steel from Türkiye in 2025 (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026), a volume that gives Turkish producers a strong reason to weigh this transition against its capital cost.
Cement producers face a harder decarbonization path. Approximately 60% of Portland cement's emissions come from the chemical decomposition of limestone (calcination), which is unavoidable in conventional clinker production.
The viable paths are clinker substitution using blast furnace slag, fly ash, or calcined clay, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) at the kiln. Neither is fast or cheap, but the financial arithmetic at 2030 and 2034 makes both worth modeling.
Fertilizer and hydrogen producers have a more immediate decarbonization option: switching hydrogen production from natural gas (grey hydrogen, about 9–12 tCO₂ per tonne H₂) to electrolysis using renewable electricity (green hydrogen, about 0–0.3 tCO₂ per tonne H₂); both are rough intensities, not default values.
Hydrogen counts direct emissions only, and hydrogen with verified direct emissions below the free allocation adjustment (0.975 × 5.089 = 4.96 tCO₂e per tonne for 2026 imports) owes no certificates while that adjustment lasts.
The adjustment shrinks every year and ends in 2034, and derived ammonia and urea still carry their own direct and indirect emissions. Low-carbon production also positions the exporter to capture EU premium pricing for green molecules.
Decarbonization investment decisions should be modeled against the full 2026–2034 CBAM cost trajectory, not against 2026 prices alone.
On default values, the cost of Turkish semi-finished steel (CN 7207 11 14) rises from €99.70 per tonne for 2026 imports to €189.38 for 2030 imports at a constant €82.32, and to €247.21 from 2034, when no free allocation is deducted.
These later-year figures use today's benchmark, which may be updated for goods imported from 2027 (recital 10 of IR (EU) 2025/2620).
Option 4: Redirect Exports Away from EU Markets
Redirecting exports away from EU markets eliminates CBAM exposure entirely and represents a viable CBAM strategy for producers whose products have fungible demand in non-CBAM markets.
The strategic logic is straightforward: if the EU market imposes a growing carbon price burden that competitors in non-EU markets do not face, redirecting volume preserves margin. The window for this strategy is narrowing.
The United Kingdom's own CBAM starts on January 1, 2027 as a tax on 5 sectors (aluminium, cement, fertilizers, hydrogen, and iron and steel), charged on direct emissions only.
Its legal basis is Part 5 of the Finance Act 2026 and five statutory instruments made between July and September 2026. The House of Commons approved the one that needed a resolution, SI 2026/809 on the rate and carbon price relief, on October 14, 2026.
On October 16, 2026 HMRC published the UK default values for all five sectors: one value per good regardless of origin, with a 10% mark-up except for fertiliser. HMRC's guidance says registration will open by January 1, 2028, and a business that triggers registration during 2027 has until January 31, 2028 to register.
Canada has not enacted a border carbon adjustment as of October 12, 2026: the Department of Finance consultation launched on August 5, 2021 is closed and archived, and Budget 2025 of November 4, 2025 does not mention one.
In the US, the Foreign Pollution Fee Act of 2025 (S.1325) was introduced in the Senate on April 8, 2025 and referred to the Finance Committee the same day; Congress.gov showed no further action on October 12, 2026.
Only the UK has a dated mechanism so far, but producers who divert away from the EU should not assume that alternative markets will stay free of carbon border charges.
Market redirection is most viable for 3 types of exporters: producers in developing economies whose domestic markets are growing rapidly (for example, Indian steel producers redirecting toward Southeast Asian infrastructure demand), producers with genuinely high carbon intensity who cannot make the economics of data provision or decarbonization work, and smaller-volume producers for whom the EU represented a small share of total exports and transition costs outweigh the retained margin.
Market redirection carries its own costs: new market development, logistics reconfiguration, potentially lower margin in alternative markets, and the risk of anti-circumvention provisions if the goods are subsequently processed and re-exported to the EU.
Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 addresses circumvention, defined as a change in the pattern of trade without sufficient economic justification, such as slightly modifying goods so that they fall under CN codes outside Annex I.
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Option 5: Pursue Article 9 Recognition Through National Carbon Pricing
Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 allows EU importers to deduct the carbon price effectively paid in the country of production from the CBAM certificate obligation.
Pursuing Article 9 recognition is a government-led CBAM strategy that requires the exporter's home country to establish a qualifying carbon pricing scheme and seek Commission recognition. Exporters cannot claim Article 9 individually; the deduction flows through the EU importer once the Commission formally recognizes the third-country carbon price.
Article 9 itself sets two tests: the carbon price must have been effectively paid in the third country, and any rebate or other form of compensation, free allocation included, is taken into account.
The details sit in an implementing act that is still a draft. Voluntary carbon offsets, internal corporate carbon prices, and government subsidies that reduce energy costs indirectly are not a carbon price effectively paid.
As of November 4, 2026, no country's carbon price has been recognised by the Commission for Article 9 purposes, though the recognition process has moved forward on paper: on 13 May 2026 the Commission published a draft Implementing Regulation setting out how carbon prices paid abroad will be assessed and deducted, covering four recognition pathways (ETS, point-source carbon taxes, fuel-based carbon taxes, and mixed-compliance systems) and capping the use of Article 6 international carbon credits at 10% of reported emissions.
Public consultation on the draft closed 10 June 2026, and the regulation had not been adopted as of October 12, 2026.
South Korea's K-ETS has operated since 2015 and covered 77.75% of national emissions in 2023 (ICAP), at an average 2025 secondary-market price of KRW 9,393 (USD 6.60); ICAP reports that steel keeps 100% free allocation in Phase 4 (2026 to 2030).
South Africa's carbon tax carries a headline rate of R308 per tonne CO₂e from January 1, 2026 (about €16.62), with allowances that can reach 95%. Neither is recognised.
China's national ETS was extended to steel, cement and aluminium smelting under a work plan of March 20, 2025. Allowances are 100% freely allocated on an output-based method and the cap is intensity-based; the average 2025 secondary-market price was CNY 70.78 (USD 9.85), per ICAP. It is not recognised either.
Even where a carbon price is recognised, the financial offset is partial. Only the price effectively paid counts, and a K-ETS price of about USD 6.60 per tonne is a small fraction of the Q3 2026 CBAM certificate price of €82.32.
The strategy reduces costs but does not eliminate them. Exporters in countries with low or zero carbon prices derive no benefit from Article 9 and should focus their CBAM strategy on Options 1–4 instead.
How to Choose the Right CBAM Strategy: Decision Framework
Non-EU exporters should evaluate CBAM strategy options across 5 decision dimensions: EU market dependency, emissions intensity relative to defaults, the carbon intensity of the sector and its production route, whether the home country has a carbon price that producers effectively pay, and the size of the installation, which sets the return on data collection.
The decision framework below maps these dimensions to the most appropriate primary strategy:
| Decision Dimension | High | Low |
|---|---|---|
| EU share of total exports | Options 1, 3 most important | Option 4 viable |
| Actual emissions vs. default | Option 1 saves the most | Option 2 acceptable short-term |
| Carbon-intensive sector (steel BF-BOF, grey hydrogen) | Option 3 critical by 2030 | Option 2 transitionally acceptable |
| Home country has a carbon price that producers effectively pay | Option 5 applicable | Options 1–4 only |
| Large production installation (high data collection ROI) | Option 1 repays quickly | Option 2 until data system is built |
The 2026 filing calendar matters for planning. Verifier registration opened on September 1, 2026. The first CBAM declaration covering calendar year 2026 is due September 30, 2027. Certificate purchases begin February 1, 2027.
Exporters who begin building emissions monitoring systems and verifier relationships in 2026 are better positioned for the first full compliance cycle. Those who wait until 2027 face both a compressed verification timeline and a growing default mark-up.
The most common strategic error for non-EU exporters is treating 2026 as a low-stakes year. The cost of 2026 imports is already charged in full above the benchmark, and the monitoring data collected in 2026 becomes the basis for the first verified declaration.
Producers who do not monitor in 2026 cannot retroactively reconstruct the data that verifiers need for the September 2027 cycle.
Contextual Border: How CBAM Strategy Connects to the Broader Export Compliance Picture
Choosing a CBAM strategy does not exist in isolation from the broader compliance obligations of EU-bound exports. The CBAM Operators Portal is the technical infrastructure through which exporters interact with the EU system.
Registering on the portal, uploading installation data, and granting importer access are operational steps that underpin Options 1 and 5. Registration is voluntary: an unregistered producer can send the same emissions report and verification report to each buyer directly, but registration lets one upload serve every buyer and limits what each buyer sees to the summary.
Does CBAM Strategy Differ by Sector?
CBAM strategy varies significantly by sector because embedded emissions intensity, default value penalties, and decarbonization pathways differ across the 6 covered sectors. The sector-specific CBAM default values determine how large the financial gap is between reporting actual data and accepting the published default. The 3 key sector patterns are listed below.
Steel and aluminium producers face the highest gross embedded emissions but also the widest gap between defaults and best-in-class actual emissions. The incentive to submit actual data is strongest in these sectors.
Cement producers face an unusual constraint: calcination chemistry makes deep decarbonization structurally harder than in steel. Options 1 and 3 (data provision plus long-run CCS investment) are the dominant strategic combination.
Fertilizer and hydrogen producers have the most dramatic decarbonization option available: hydrogen with verified direct emissions below the free allocation adjustment owes no certificates while that adjustment lasts, and green ammonia and urea carry far lower embedded emissions, although they still count their own direct and indirect emissions. The capital cost is high, but the EU premium for green ammonia and green urea creates a revenue-side offset that no other sector has.
Is CBAM Strategy Different for Small Exporters?
Small exporters whose EU buyers fall below the 50-tonne annual mass de minimis threshold face no direct CBAM exposure from those buyers. The Commission's first assessment of the threshold, published September 30, 2026, found that it exempts 0.87% of embedded emissions, while the large majority of importing companies by count fall below it. If your EU buyers are large industrial importers purchasing hundreds or thousands of tonnes per year, they are above the threshold and the CBAM obligation is active regardless of the volume from any single exporter.
Can Exporters Avoid CBAM by Changing CN Codes?
Changing tariff classification to avoid CBAM coverage is considered circumvention under Regulation (EU) 2023/956. Article 27 defines circumvention as a change in the pattern of trade that lacks sufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding CBAM obligations, including slightly modifying goods so that they fall under CN codes not listed in Annex I. The Commission monitors and investigates such practices and can add the modified goods to Annex I by delegated act (Article 27(6)).
This is not a viable CBAM strategy. Exporters whose home country operates a carbon pricing scheme can pursue a cost reduction through CBAM Article 9 once a carbon price is recognised, which is the only legitimate route to reducing the certificate obligation without changing what is produced or how.
Will More Products Be Covered by CBAM in Future?
The Commission's original proposal, COM(2025)989, would expand CBAM downstream to approximately 180 additional products from January 1, 2028. Both co-legislators have since moved to widen that scope: the Council adopted a general approach on 12 June 2026 that adds about 200 eight-digit CN codes of steel- and aluminium-containing products to the Commission's list (the count of added codes reported by Mayer Brown), and the European Parliament's ENVI committee went further on 6 July 2026 (vote 56-11-12), backing coverage of an estimated 457 downstream products alongside tighter anti-circumvention rules.
Parliament's plenary adopted its first-reading negotiating mandate on September 15, 2026 (464 for, 50 against, 159 abstentions). The file is still a proposal: the first trilogue on October 20, 2026 ended without an overall agreement (press reports), a second is reported for November 30, 2026, and the institutions aim for a deal that would let the extension apply from January 1, 2028.
Annex I already reaches a short way downstream today: tubes and pipes (7304 to 7306), steel structures (7308), screws and bolts (7318) and other articles of iron or steel (7326) are on the list. The proposal would add further steel- and aluminium-containing products. Producers of these products should monitor the expansion process and begin preparing data infrastructure now rather than waiting for formal adoption.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the best CBAM strategy for a non-EU exporter?
The best CBAM strategy for non-EU exporters whose actual emissions fall below the CBAM default values is to provide verified actual emissions data through the CBAM Operators Portal. This avoids the default mark-up (which rises to +30% from 2028) and protects EU market share as cost pass-back from importers increases through 2034.
Do non-EU exporters have any direct legal obligation under CBAM?
Non-EU exporters have no direct legal obligation under Regulation (EU) 2023/956. The legal and financial obligation falls entirely on the EU-authorized CBAM declarant (the importer). The commercial obligation exists because EU importers require verified embedded emissions data from exporters to calculate their certificate liability accurately.
Can exporters claim Article 9 carbon price deductions directly?
Exporters cannot claim Article 9 deductions directly. The reduction is claimed by the EU importer based on the carbon price effectively paid by the production installation in the country of origin. The implementing regulation that sets out how such prices are assessed was published as a draft in May 2026 and had not been adopted as of October 12, 2026, and no country's carbon price has been recognised.
What happens if an exporter provides no emissions data?
If an exporter provides no emissions data, the EU importer applies the CBAM default values published under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621. These defaults carry a mark-up of +10% above the calculated sector default in 2026, +20% in 2027 and +30% from 2028 onward; fertilizers carry 1% in every year. The importer typically passes this extra cost back to the exporter as a lower purchase price or switches to a supplier who can provide data.
Is redirecting exports away from the EU a viable long-term CBAM strategy?
Redirecting exports away from the EU suits only some producers and carries its own risk. The UK's CBAM starts on January 1, 2027, and HMRC's guidance says registration will open by January 1, 2028.
Canada has not enacted a border carbon adjustment as of October 12, 2026: the Department of Finance consultation launched on August 5, 2021 is closed and archived, and Budget 2025 of November 4, 2025 does not mention one. In the US, the Foreign Pollution Fee Act of 2025 (S.1325) has seen no action since its referral to the Senate Finance Committee on April 8, 2025 (Congress.gov, checked October 12, 2026). Producers who rely on export redirection as their primary CBAM strategy face the risk that alternative markets adopt equivalent mechanisms.