
Developing countries face CBAM exposure that ranges from negligible to heavy depending on their export mix. Mozambique's exports of CBAM goods to the EU, most of them aluminium, were worth around 5.5% of its GDP in 2024, according to the European Commission's review report of December 16, 2025 (COM(2025) 783).
The debate centers on a fundamental question: does the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, established by Regulation (EU) 2023/956, represent sound climate policy or a new form of trade barrier dressed in environmental language?
The answer differs sharply depending on whether the country in question is a major emerging economy or a least-developed nation with limited diplomatic leverage. This article maps who bears the highest financial exposure, how the controversy has escalated into a formal WTO challenge, and what options remain for affected governments and exporters.
What Is CBAM's Financial Impact on Developing Nations?
CBAM's financial impact on developing nations is a certificate-based obligation that falls legally on EU importers but transfers economically to non-EU exporters through price renegotiation, contract restructuring, or lost competitiveness.
The mechanism requires EU importers of steel, cement, aluminium, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen to purchase CBAM certificates for the embedded CO₂ emissions of their imports, after a free allocation adjustment, priced from EU ETS auctions (the official Q3 2026 certificate price is €82.32 per tonne CO₂e).
The key distinction is between legal and commercial burden. Non-EU exporters, including those in developing countries, carry no direct legal obligation under Regulation (EU) 2023/956. The EU importer holds the legal compliance duty.
But commercial reality operates differently: EU buyers facing higher landed costs either absorb the difference, pass it to consumers, or press their suppliers for lower export prices. Exporters in developing countries with limited market power face the third option by default.
The net financial impact in 2026 is not small for goods imported on default values. The legal CBAM factor, the share of EU ETS free allocation retained, is 97.5% in 2026, and it is applied to the benchmark of the good, not to its emissions.
For hot-rolled flat steel from India (CN 7208), the default value of 4.280 tCO₂e per tonne becomes 4.708 with the 10% mark-up, and 0.975 × the benchmark of 1.370 is deducted. That leaves 3.37225 certificates per tonne, or €277.60 at the official Q3 2026 price of €82.32.
The mechanism undergoes its sharpest step between 2029 and 2030, when the CBAM factor falls from 77.5% to 51.5%, and no CBAM factor applies from 2034.
On the same default, benchmark and price, the Indian example rises to €399.95 per tonne in 2030 and €458.03 per tonne in 2034, with the mark-up at 30% from 2028. Governments and exporters that treat default values as an acceptable long-term basis are making a serious planning error.
The EU CBAM mechanism prices emissions at EU ETS levels (€82.32 per tonne CO₂e for Q3 2026), while carbon prices in most developing nations range from zero to approximately $10 per tonne CO₂, the 2025 average in China's recently expanded national ETS according to ICAP. This gap is where the competitive asymmetry lives.
Which Developing Countries Face the Highest CBAM Exposure?
Four categories of exposure exist among developing nations: major emerging economies with high trade volumes, geographically captive mid-sized exporters, least-developed countries with narrow export bases, and nations with strategic green transition opportunities.
Major Emerging Economies: India and China
India supplied €5.30 billion of the EU's imports of CBAM-covered goods (Annex I codes) in 2025, 4.8% of extra-EU import value and the sixth-largest origin; €4.39 billion of that was iron and steel of Chapters 72 and 73. Its steel tonnage fell from 4.60 million tonnes in 2024 to 4.01 million tonnes in 2025 (Eurostat Comext, extracted October 12, 2026).
India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) covers aluminium and cement in Phase 1 but excludes the steel sector entirely.
The scheme is intensity-based rather than absolute-cap, and it has not been recognised for the Article 9 reduction that would lower an EU importer's certificate obligation. As of October 12, 2026, no country's carbon price has been.
China is the largest origin by value: €17.09 billion in 2025, 15.4% of extra-EU import value and 9.5% of tonnage, of which €13.45 billion was iron and steel and €3.25 billion aluminium (Eurostat Comext, 2025).
China expanded its national ETS in March 2025 to cover steel, cement, and aluminium, adding approximately 3 billion tonnes CO₂ and 1,500 entities.
However, allowances are 100% freely allocated on an output-based method and the 2025 average price was about $9.85 per tonne CO₂ (ICAP), so little or no carbon price is effectively paid, and the scheme is not recognised under Article 9.
China's steel slab default value under CBAM (CN 7207 12 10) is 3.169 tCO₂e per tonne, or 3.486 with the 2026 mark-up, against a default benchmark of 1.364.
On those inputs an importer owes 2.156 certificates per tonne, €177.48 at €82.32. Producers with lower verified emissions have a large incentive to provide actual emissions data rather than accept the default.
For detailed country-specific analysis of these two major economies, see the dedicated pages covering CBAM India exposure and the CBAM China position in EU trade negotiations.
Turkey: The Largest Supplier by Tonnage
The EU imported €10.83 billion of CBAM-covered goods from Türkiye in 2025 and 14.81 million tonnes, more tonnage than from any other origin (Eurostat Comext, extracted October 12, 2026). Türkiye is the largest origin of the EU's cement and clinker imports, with 43.0% of extra-EU imports by quantity.
It is also the second-largest origin of CBAM-covered steel (7.43 million tonnes) and the third-largest of aluminium (684 thousand tonnes). Geographic proximity and deep supply chain integration with EU manufacturers limit Turkey's ability to divert trade to alternative markets, a constraint that amplifies CBAM's leverage.
Turkey enacted its Climate Law No. 7552 on July 9, 2025, and the Türkiye Emissions Trading System Regulation entered into force on August 27, 2026. The pilot runs 2026 through 2027 with 100% free allocation, meaning no carbon price is "effectively paid" in the sense required for an Article 9 deduction.
The cement data gap is particularly stark. Türkiye's own Annex I rows for grey clinker and grey Portland cement show a dash, so the "Other countries" defaults apply: 1.410 tCO₂e per tonne for grey clinker (1.551 with the 2026 mark-up) and 1.440 for grey Portland cement (1.584 with the mark-up).
Türkçimento's own figure for Turkish grey clinker is approximately 0.88 tCO₂ per tonne, about 0.67 tCO₂e below the clinker default with mark-up.
The saving from verified actual emissions is that gap priced at the certificate price (about €55 per tonne of clinker at €82.32), adjusted for the difference in benchmark basis between the default and actual-value paths.
Malaysia: The First Official ASEAN Costing
Malaysia became the first ASEAN government to publish an official costing of its CBAM exposure.
In a parliamentary reply reported internationally on August 6, 2026 by Carbon Pulse and GMK Center, Malaysia's Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) cited a Malaysian Steel Institute estimate putting the 2026 CBAM compliance bill for the country's iron and steel industry at roughly MYR 970.7 million, about USD 237 million, with costs expected to rise in subsequent years.
Malaysia has no carbon price in force (the carbon tax announced for 2026 was deferred, as The Star reported on October 5, 2026), which leaves verified actual emissions data as the main cost lever available to its steel exporters.
An official government figure carries different weight from analyst estimates: it commits the government to a position on the size of the problem and gives the EU a counterpart number in bilateral discussions.
The reply is covered in Malaysia's USD 237 million CBAM steel bill, and the CBAM Malaysia country guide maps the export profile and policy response in detail.
Least-Developed Countries: The Hidden Vulnerability
Mozambique is the most trade-exposed least-developed country. Its exports of CBAM goods to the EU, most of them aluminium, came to €1.2 billion in 2024, around 5.5% of its GDP, according to the Commission's review report of December 16, 2025 (COM(2025) 783).
Eurostat records 619 thousand tonnes of aluminium from Mozambique in 2025, worth €1.56 billion and 6.8% of extra-EU aluminium imports by quantity (Comext, extracted October 12, 2026).
The same report notes that the aluminium comes from one company. Its modelling puts the effect of CBAM on Mozambique's GDP by 2035 at minus 0.01% against the baseline and on its aluminium output at minus 0.4%, on the ground that the production is among the cleaner outside the EU. The exposure is a concentration risk more than a modelled loss.
Egypt supplied 44.3% of the EU's extra-EU urea imports by quantity in 2025, 3.29 million tonnes, and 1.65 million tonnes of cement and clinker, most of it clinker (Eurostat Comext, extracted October 12, 2026). About 30.6% of Egypt's fertilizer exports go to the EU (World Bank 2022 data, via EnterpriseAM).
Egypt has no carbon pricing scheme, so no Article 9 reduction can arise and the full CBAM cost applies to its EU-bound exports.
The financial pressure on Egyptian fertilizer producers is compounded by the separate EU additional tariffs on Russian and Belarusian fertilizers that took effect in July 2025, which have reshaped global fertilizer trade flows and intensified EU market competition.
The table below summarizes the exposure profile for key developing and emerging nations.
| Country | Main CBAM Sectors | Current Carbon Price | Article 9 Status (October 12, 2026) | EU Imports of CBAM-Covered Goods, 2025 (Eurostat Comext) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| China | Steel, aluminium | ~$10/tCO₂ (national ETS, 2025 average; 100% free allocation) | Not recognised | €17.09 billion, 15.4% of extra-EU import value |
| India | Steel, aluminium | ~$10/t target (CCTS) | Not recognised | €5.30 billion, 4.8% of value |
| Turkey | Cement, steel, aluminium | None effectively paid (pilot ETS, 100% free allocation) | Not recognised | €10.83 billion, 9.7% of value; largest origin by tonnage |
| Mozambique | Aluminium | None | No carbon price | €1.56 billion, 1.4% of value; around 5.5% of GDP in 2024 (Commission) |
| Egypt | Fertilizers, cement | None | No carbon price | €2.78 billion, 2.5% of value; 44.3% of urea imports by quantity |
| South Africa | Steel, aluminium | R308/tCO₂e headline rate (about €17), before allowances of 60% to 95% | Not recognised | €1.24 billion, 1.1% of value |
| South Korea | Steel | ~$6–7/tCO₂ (K-ETS; 100% free allocation for steel, per ICAP) | Not recognised | €4.12 billion, 3.7% of value |
| Morocco | Fertilizers, cement | None | No carbon price | €1.03 billion, 0.9% of value |
Why Is CBAM Controversial Among Developing Nations?
The controversy surrounding CBAM and developing countries concentrates on three intersecting objections: the CBDR principle, the revenue allocation decision, and the Article 9 deduction's structural inaccessibility for low-income exporters.
The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Argument
The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) principle, embedded in UNFCCC frameworks and the Paris Agreement, holds that developed nations bear greater historical responsibility for cumulative greenhouse gas emissions and must therefore take on greater mitigation obligations.
India's Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has called CBAM unilateral and arbitrary and a barrier to trade, arguing that imposing EU-priced carbon costs on Indian exporters ignores the different development stages of the two economies.
India has raised CBAM in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment and reserved third-party rights in Russia's dispute DS639, but as of October 12, 2026 it has not lodged a WTO dispute of its own.
The EU-India Free Trade Agreement concluded on January 27, 2026 (Commission press release IP/26/184) without any CBAM exemption or carve-out for India: the Commission explicitly stated no commitment to change CBAM obligations or grant India more favourable treatment, though the provisional text reportedly includes a non-discrimination clause ensuring India is not treated worse than any other third country if the EU grants CBAM flexibilities elsewhere.
The BASIC countries, comprising Brazil, India, South Africa, and China, have coordinated their multilateral opposition. The core shared argument holds that CBAM revenue stays in Europe rather than returning to developing nations to finance their decarbonization.
Regulation (EU) 2023/956 contains no rule on how the revenue is spent. Member States sell the certificates (Article 20), so the proceeds accrue to national budgets.
The Commission's proposal for a new Own Resources Decision (COM(2025) 574, July 16, 2025) would transfer 75% of that revenue to the EU budget from 2028, and its Temporary Decarbonisation Fund proposal would draw on the other 25% for 2026 and 2027.
As of October 12, 2026 neither proposal is law, and nothing is committed to third-country climate finance.
The wider BRICS group escalated this equity framing to ministerial level on August 18, 2026. BRICS Environment Ministers, meeting in New Delhi under India's chairship, issued a joint statement opposing "unilateral, punitive, discriminatory, and protectionist" carbon border measures as inconsistent with international law and as a burden on developing economies.
As covered by euobserver and Business Standard, the ministers coupled their opposition with demands for expanded climate finance from developed countries. The statement adds no legal proceeding, but it converts the BASIC-era revenue grievance into a formal collective position of the enlarged BRICS bloc. The New Delhi statement is covered in BRICS ministers condemn CBAM.
Revenue Allocation and Climate Finance
The revenue allocation question is the most concrete source of international friction. The Commission's own estimate for the first years is modest: its Temporary Decarbonisation Fund proposal (COM(2025) 990) budgets Member State contributions of €308.3 million and €324.2 million, each equal to 25% of certificate revenue for 2026 and for 2027.
That implies total revenue of about €1.23 billion and €1.30 billion, by this site's arithmetic, and revenue grows as free allocation phases out.
Developing nations arguing for revenue recycling point to the logic that CBAM makes their exports more expensive in order to fund a level playing field for EU producers, while the revenue from that mechanism then benefits EU competitiveness rather than supporting decarbonization in the countries whose exports it penalizes.
The EU's legal defense on revenue allocation is that CBAM is an environmental measure grounded in Article 192(1) TFEU and is not a trade instrument, meaning WTO-style non-discrimination obligations do not govern its revenue distribution.
This argument remains untested in dispute settlement as of October 12, 2026: in WTO case DS639, Russia requested consultations on May 12, 2025, the EU declined them on May 22, 2025, and Russia requested establishment of a panel on July 10, 2026.
The EU blocked that first panel request at the DSB meeting of July 24, 2026, and the DSB established the panel on Russia's second request on September 25, 2026.
As of October 12, 2026 the panel has not been composed and has not ruled, 27 WTO members have reserved third-party rights, and no other WTO member has filed a formal CBAM dispute.
The Article 9 Deduction's Structural Inaccessibility
Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 allows EU importers to claim a reduction in certificate obligations for a carbon price effectively paid in the country of origin, with any rebate or compensation taken into account.
For least-developed countries with no carbon pricing scheme, this provision is entirely inaccessible. For emerging economies with nascent carbon markets, the barrier is practical: where allowances are allocated free of charge, as in China's national ETS and Türkiye's pilot, little or no price is effectively paid.
The implementing act is still a draft as of October 12, 2026, and no country's carbon price has been recognised. Where default values are used, a reduction may be claimed only by reference to yearly default carbon prices that the Commission may set from 2027 (Article 9(4)).
The verification cost barrier compounds the Article 9 gap. Verification is required only where actual values are declared, and market estimates from verification providers run from €5,000 to €50,000 per installation, including the physical site visit required in the first year of verification.
For a small Indian or Egyptian steel mill exporting 200 tonnes per year to the EU, verification costs can equal or exceed the total annual CBAM certificate obligation, making compliance economically irrational.
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What Options Do Developing Nations Have in Response to CBAM?
Developing nations and their exporters have five practical response pathways, ranging from immediate operational adjustments to long-term structural repositioning.
The five response options available to affected countries are listed below.
- Submit verified actual emissions data: Exporters whose actual emissions fall below country default values can eliminate the default mark-up penalty. China's steel slab default (CN 7207 12 10) is 3.169 tCO₂e per tonne, or 3.486 with the 2026 mark-up, so a producer with verified emissions of 2.0 tCO₂e per tonne would declare about 1.49 tCO₂e less per tonne. The saving is that gap priced at the certificate price, adjusted for the difference in benchmark basis between the two paths.
- Accelerate domestic carbon pricing schemes: A carbon price effectively paid in the country of origin can reduce exporters' net CBAM cost once the Article 9 rules apply; no scheme had been recognised as of October 12, 2026. South Korea's K-ETS has operated since 2015, but ICAP reports that leakage-exposed sectors such as steel keep 100% free allocation in Phase 4 (2026 to 2030), so the price effectively paid can be far below the market price.
- Pursue WTO dispute resolution: Russia filed WTO DS639 on May 12, 2025, the first formal CBAM challenge, alleging violations of GATT Articles I, II, III, X and XI, the Import Licensing Agreement, and the SCM Agreement read with GATT Articles VI and XVI. The EU declined consultations on May 22, 2025, an unusual procedural response, and the panel was established on September 25, 2026 on Russia's second request. DS639 faces a structural enforcement barrier: the WTO Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019, and Russia does not participate in the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, the substitute that the EU uses with other participants. Any panel ruling can be appealed into a permanent void, limiting DS639's practical enforceability.
- Engage bilateral negotiations for transitional arrangements: Ukraine, as an EU accession candidate, is developing a domestic ETS aligned with EU requirements and has asked the EU for CBAM relief, although no exemption exists today. Other developing nations can pursue bilateral engagement to secure technical assistance for emissions measurement, monitoring, and verification system development.
- Reposition toward green production: Morocco, with 23 GW of renewable energy capacity targeted by 2030 and the OCP Group's $7 billion green ammonia platform under development, represents a country positioned to gain EU market share as competitors with higher carbon intensity face growing CBAM costs through the 2030s.
How Does CBAM Treat Least-Developed Countries vs. Emerging Economies?
Least-developed countries and emerging economies receive formally identical treatment under CBAM, which is itself a source of significant controversy. Regulation (EU) 2023/956 contains no special provisions for LDC status, per capita income, or development stage. A Mozambican aluminium producer and a Chinese steel major face the same certificate obligation structure under the same regulatory text.
The Commission's review report of December 16, 2025 (COM(2025) 783) records the objection of developing-country partners that CBAM "does not exempt or otherwise differentiate in favour of products from developing countries", and it proposes no such exemption.
Its modelling puts the effect of CBAM on the GDP of least-developed countries in aggregate at less than 0.01% by 2035. Ukraine has asked the EU for CBAM relief, and no exemption exists as of October 12, 2026.
For non-EU exporters seeking to understand their compliance obligations and strategic options, understanding non-EU exporter obligations under the current framework is a necessary starting point regardless of the country's development status.
The practical inequality between LDCs and emerging economies emerges from access to finance, institutional capacity, and market leverage. A large emerging economy like India or Turkey can mobilize government resources, industry associations, and diplomatic channels to build verification infrastructure, establish carbon pricing schemes, and engage the EU in bilateral technical dialogues.
A country like Mozambique, with a single dominant CBAM-exposed installation and limited government capacity, cannot easily replicate this response.
Is CBAM Compatible With WTO Rules?
CBAM's WTO compatibility remains legally contested as of October 12, 2026. The EU defends the mechanism under GATT Article XX(b) as necessary to protect human, animal, and plant life from climate change, and under Article XX(g) as a measure for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
Russia's WTO DS639 challenge alleges violations of GATT Articles I, II, III, X and XI and of the Import Licensing Agreement, and of the SCM Agreement's subsidy disciplines, read with GATT Articles VI and XVI, applied to EU ETS free allocation. Russia requested establishment of a panel on July 10, 2026, the EU blocked that first request at the DSB meeting of July 24, 2026, and the DSB established the panel on the second request on September 25, 2026. It is the first WTO panel on a carbon border measure. As of October 12, 2026 it has not been composed and has not ruled.
The deeper structural issue for WTO enforcement is that the Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019. Any panel ruling on WTO-compatibility of CBAM can be appealed by the losing party into a void, meaning even a ruling against the EU carries no binding enforcement mechanism in the near term.
Does CBAM Violate the UNFCCC's Common But Differentiated Responsibilities Principle?
CBAM does not explicitly reference the CBDR principle and the EU rejects the argument that CBDR obliges it to exempt developing country exports from environmental border measures. The EU's legal basis in Article 192(1) TFEU treats CBAM as a domestic environmental measure extended to the border to prevent carbon leakage, not as a trade instrument subject to development-finance obligations.
India's government and the BASIC country group argue that pricing emissions in developing-country exports at EU ETS rates, without returning revenue to fund those countries' decarbonization, violates the spirit and practical operation of climate equity commitments.
The BRICS Environment Ministers' joint statement of August 18, 2026, issued in New Delhi under India's chairship, is the most recent collective expression of this position, opposing "unilateral, punitive, discriminatory, and protectionist" carbon border measures as inconsistent with international law. This is a political and normative dispute as much as a legal one, and no multilateral forum has adjudicated it as of October 12, 2026.
Which Developing Country Is Most Exposed to CBAM?
By tonnage, Türkiye is the largest origin of the EU's imports of CBAM-covered goods: 14.81 million tonnes and €10.83 billion in 2025, including 43.0% of extra-EU cement and clinker imports by quantity (Eurostat Comext, extracted October 12, 2026). China is the largest by value, at €17.09 billion.
Relative to the size of its economy, Mozambique stands out: its exports of CBAM goods to the EU, mostly aluminium, were around 5.5% of its GDP in 2024, according to the Commission's review report of December 16, 2025, although that report's modelling finds a GDP effect of minus 0.01% by 2035. India's exposure is also political: the EU-India Free Trade Agreement concluded on January 27, 2026 without any CBAM concession.
Will the EU Reform CBAM to Address Developing Country Concerns?
As of October 12, 2026, the EU still has not proposed structural reforms to CBAM's developing-country treatment. The Commission's review report of December 16, 2025 (COM(2025) 783) proposed no exemption for developing countries, and no subsequent Commission proposal has introduced LDC-status or development-stage exemptions.
If anything, the legislative trend runs the other way. On September 15, 2026 the European Parliament adopted its first-reading mandate on the downstream product expansion proposal (COM(2025)989, procedure 2025/0419(COD)) by 464 votes to 50, with 159 abstentions, covering roughly 457 finished-goods categories by trade-press estimate. That goes beyond the Council's June 12, 2026 general approach, which had already widened the Commission's original circa-180-product list (about 200 added codes per Mayer Brown; just over 300 entries and codes in total by cbamguide.com's count). The extension remains a proposal, targeted to take effect from 2028: the first trilogue on October 20, 2026 ended without an overall agreement, according to press reports, and a second is reported for November 30, 2026.
The EU's stated response to development concerns remains limited to trade facilitation, technical assistance for emissions monitoring, and the Article 9 deduction mechanism, for which the Commission published a draft implementing regulation on carbon prices paid in third countries on May 13, 2026 (public feedback closed June 10, 2026; not yet adopted as of October 12, 2026). Structural exemptions for LDC status or development-stage differentiation remain absent from any published Commission proposal.
Can a Developing Country Reduce Its CBAM Exposure Without a Carbon Tax?
A developing country can reduce its CBAM exposure through one route that does not require a national carbon pricing scheme: verified actual emissions reporting. Exporters whose verified actual embedded emissions fall below the country-specific default values pay certificates based on actual emissions rather than the more expensive defaults. The default mark-up schedule increases from 10% above calculated averages in 2026 to 30% above calculated averages from 2028 onward, making the penalty for failing to verify larger each year. Exporters that submit verified actual data and demonstrate emissions below the default can eliminate this mark-up entirely. The barrier for least-developed country exporters is primarily the cost of accredited third-party verification, which ranges from €5,000 to €50,000 per production installation.
Does CBAM Apply to All Developing Country Exports to the EU?
CBAM applies only to the six covered sectors: iron and steel, cement, aluminium, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen. Developing countries whose EU exports are concentrated in these sectors face full exposure. Countries whose EU exports are concentrated in textiles, agriculture, electronics, or services face no CBAM obligation at all. The de minimis threshold of 50 tonnes annual mass per EU importer exempts approximately 90% of EU importing companies from CBAM obligations, though these exempted companies account for only approximately 1% of total embedded emissions covered by the mechanism. For an exporter decarbonization strategy that accounts for the full 2026–2034 cost trajectory, understanding where free allocation phases out most steeply is the critical first step.