
Vietnam shipped about 2.08 million tonnes of steel worth nearly USD 1.4 billion to the EU in 2025, its second-largest steel market after ASEAN, according to Vietnam Steel Association figures published by the WTO and Integration Center of VCCI on April 13, 2026.
Eurostat counts more: 2.94 million tonnes and €2.36 billion of CBAM-covered iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 imported into the EU27 from Viet Nam in 2025, 5.1% of extra-EU imports by quantity and the eighth-largest origin (Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026).
The two series are not comparable: Eurostat records Annex I codes by country of origin at the EU border, and the association's figure is an exporter-side one.
That volume brings a specific complication: re-rollers and coating lines that buy imported hot-rolled coil or slab carry that material's embedded emissions into the CBAM calculation, and Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 targets practices of circumvention.
The Commission monitors circumvention at Union level under Article 27(3); this site found no Commission document naming Vietnam as a monitored circumvention pattern as of October 12, 2026.
Understanding how CBAM applies to Vietnam requires separating two distinct issues: the direct compliance obligations that fall on EU importers of Vietnamese steel, and the circumvention risk that shapes the documentation those importers and their Vietnamese suppliers must hold.
This article covers Vietnam's pilot ETS, launched in August 2025, the circumvention framework under Article 27, the financial exposure of Vietnamese steel producers at the official Q3 2026 certificate price of €82.32 per tonne CO₂e, published October 5, 2026, and the compliance steps that reduce risk for both EU importers and their Vietnamese counterparts.
What Is Vietnam's CBAM Exposure in 2026?
Vietnam's CBAM exposure concentrates in steel, including downstream processing operations where imported hot-rolled coil and slab are transformed into finished steel products before export to the EU. Processing that lacks due cause or economic justification other than avoiding CBAM obligations falls under the Article 27 anti-circumvention provisions of Regulation (EU) 2023/956, which the Commission monitors at Union level.
Steel accounts for almost all of the trade: €2.36 billion of the €2.47 billion of CBAM-covered goods the EU imported from Viet Nam in 2025 (Eurostat Comext DS-045409, extracted October 12, 2026).
The rest was aluminium (23 thousand tonnes, €99.5 million) and cement (114 thousand tonnes, €11.1 million), with fertilizers under €1 million. The largest single heading was coated flat steel (CN 7210), at 1.04 million tonnes and 16.1% of extra-EU imports by quantity.
The embedded emissions of Vietnamese-produced steel depend entirely on the production route: blast furnace-basic oxygen furnace (BF-BOF) production carries approximately 2.0 tCO₂ per tonne, while electric arc furnace (EAF) scrap-based production carries approximately 0.5 tCO₂ per tonne.
On default values the route makes no difference: every carbon steel row of the Viet Nam table in Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621 indicates the blast furnace route, at 2.350 tCO₂e per tonne for hot-rolled flat products (CN 7208).
At the official Q3 2026 price of €82.32 that is €193.45 per tonne before the free allocation adjustment.
To understand how the certificate-based mechanism works at the regulatory level, the EU CBAM article on this site covers the full authorization and declaration workflow, including how embedded emissions are calculated and reported under Regulation (EU) 2023/956.
The net cost in 2026 is not small on default values. For CN 7208 the default plus the 10% mark-up is 2.585 tCO₂e per tonne. The free allocation adjustment, the 97.5% CBAM factor × the 1.370 benchmark, removes 1.33575, which leaves 1.24925 certificates per tonne, or €102.84 at €82.32.
On the same default, benchmark and price the figure is €193.41 per tonne for 2030 imports, when the mark-up is 30% and the CBAM factor 51.5%. Vietnamese producers and their EU customers should plan on a cost that nearly doubles by 2030 before any change in the certificate price.

Text version of this infographic
- €2.47 billion: EU imports of CBAM-covered goods from Vietnam, 2025 (3.07 million tonnes. Trade statistics, not CBAM declarations)
- 15th: largest non-EU origin by value (13th by quantity, of all non-EU origins)
What the EU imports most from Vietnam
- Coated flat steel, 7210: 1,036
- Semi-finished steel, 7207: 669
- Hot-rolled flat steel, 7208: 406
- Cold-rolled flat steel, 7209: 229
- Screws, bolts and nuts, 7318: 149
Thousand tonnes in 2025, by CN code. Highlighted: the worked example below.
What one tonne costs in 2026
Hot-rolled flat steel, CN 7208 (Imported from Vietnam in 2026, on the default value. Figures in tCO₂e per tonne)
- Default value, Vietnam table: 2.350
- Plus 10% mark-up for 2026: 2.585
- Minus free allocation adjustment (97.5% × benchmark 1.370): −1.33575
- Certificates per tonne: 1.24925
Cost per tonne at the Q3 2026 price of €82.32: €102.84
The old shortcut, 2.5% of gross, says €5.32. It is wrong: the deduction stops at the benchmark, and everything above it is paid in full.
Vietnam has its own default values. The Vietnam table in Annex I has a value for each of the five goods above, so the “Other countries and territories” defaults do not apply to them.
No deduction today. Vietnam's pilot ETS (since August 2025) runs with free allocation to 2028 and is not recognised under Article 9 (as of October 23, 2026).
How Does the 2025 Vietnamese ETS Affect CBAM Compliance?
Vietnam's Emissions Trading Scheme began its pilot phase in August 2025 under Decree 119/2025/ND-CP, covering 34 thermal power plants, 25 iron and steel facilities and 51 cement plants, according to the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP). Steel production is a covered sector, which brings those 25 steel facilities into a domestic carbon market for the first time. The pilot runs to 2028, and allowances are allocated free of charge throughout.
The pilot creates a potential pathway toward an Article 9 deduction under Regulation (EU) 2023/956. Article 9 allows the EU importer to deduct a carbon price "effectively paid" in the country of origin from the CBAM certificate obligation, reducing the net financial burden on the import transaction.
The practical value of this deduction depends on two conditions: first, the Article 9 implementing rules must be adopted and must recognize a scheme of this kind; second, the carbon price actually paid by Vietnamese steel producers must be documented and certified.
Trading opened on the Hanoi Stock Exchange on June 29, 2026 at VND 130,000 to 136,000 (USD 4.95 to 5.17) per tonne of CO₂e, and no further trades were recorded by late August, according to Dezan Shira's Vietnam Briefing of September 17, 2026.
With free allocation through 2028, a mill pays only for a shortfall it buys, so the price effectively paid is too small to produce a material Article 9 deduction as of October 12, 2026.
The general Article 9 recognition framework has moved forward in the meantime: on 13 May 2026 the Commission published a draft implementing regulation setting out how carbon prices paid in third countries will be recognized, defining four qualifying pathways (emissions trading systems, point-source carbon taxes, fuel-based carbon taxes, and mixed-compliance systems) and capping the use of Article 6 international carbon credits at 10% of reported emissions.
Public feedback on the draft closed 10 June 2026, and no adoption had been confirmed as of October 12, 2026. This framework will govern how, and whether, the Vietnamese ETS could eventually support a deduction claim; no third-country carbon price, Vietnam's included, is formally recognized.
Vietnamese steelmakers should track adoption of the implementing regulation and engage their EU customers on the documentation requirements that would be needed to support any future deduction claim.
For Vietnamese producers interested in how a deduction would scale, South Korea's K-ETS provides the clearest comparison: it has operated since 2015 and had an average 2025 secondary-market price of KRW 9,393 (USD 6.60) per tonne according to ICAP, yet it is not recognized under Article 9 either.
That price is about 7% of the €82.32 certificate price, so even a recognized deduction would offset only a small part of the certificate cost.
What Are the Anti-Circumvention Rules That Apply to Vietnam?
Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 defines practices of circumvention as a change in the pattern of trade in goods that stems from a practice, process or work with insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding CBAM obligations. It names two practices as examples and leaves the list open.
The three practices relevant to Vietnamese supply chains are listed below.
- Slightly modifying goods so that they fall under CN codes not listed in Annex I, except where the modification alters their essential characteristics (Article 27(2)(a))
- Artificially splitting imports, including through non-genuine arrangements, to avoid exceeding the 50-tonne single mass-based threshold (Article 27(2)(b), added by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083)
- Routing goods through a third country to change the declared country of origin, a practice Article 27 does not name but which can meet its general definition
The Commission monitors the situation at Union level under Article 27(3) and can open an investigation on a substantiated notification or on its own initiative.
This site found no Commission document naming Vietnamese steel processing as a monitored circumvention pattern as of October 12, 2026. EU importers of Vietnamese steel should still expect questions on origin documentation, production records, and emissions reporting.
A Vietnamese manufacturer that can demonstrate genuine domestic value addition, actual domestic production capacity, and verified embedded emissions data from its own production installation is in a fundamentally different compliance position from a processor that imports Chinese semi-finished steel and performs only finishing operations before re-export.
The financial stakes of circumvention enforcement are significant. An authorized declarant that fails to surrender enough certificates by September 30 pays, for each certificate not surrendered, the EU ETS excess emissions penalty of €100 per tonne CO₂e, increased in line with the European index of consumer prices (Article 26(1)).
A person other than an authorized declarant who brings goods in without complying faces three to five times that penalty (Article 26(2)), which is €300 to €500 before indexation.
For an authorized declarant, paying the penalty does not remove the duty to surrender the outstanding certificates (Article 26(3)). An importer without the status that exceeds the 50-tonne threshold is released from declaration and surrender for those imports once it pays (Article 26(2a)).
Vietnam Steel CBAM: Financial Exposure by Production Route
The financial exposure of Vietnamese steel under CBAM varies by product, by time horizon and, once verified actual values are reported, by production route.
The table below shows what an EU importer owes per tonne on default values at the official Q3 2026 certificate price of €82.32, for 2026 imports and for 2030 imports at the same price.
| Good (CN code) | Default value (tCO₂e/t) | Default plus 2026 mark-up | Benchmark | Certificates per tonne, 2026 | Cost per tonne, 2026 at €82.32 | Cost per tonne, 2030 at €82.32 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Semi-finished steel (CN 7207 11 14) | 2.350 | 2.585 | 1.364 | 1.2551 | €103.32 | €193.66 |
| Hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) | 2.350 | 2.585 | 1.370 | 1.24925 | €102.84 | €193.41 |
| Cold-rolled flat steel (CN 7209) | 2.370 | 2.607 | 1.458 | 1.18545 | €97.59 | €191.82 |
| Coated flat steel (CN 7210) | 2.370 | 2.607 | 1.491 | 1.153275 | €94.94 | €190.42 |
| Bars and rods (CN 7213 and CN 7214 20 00) | 2.350 | 2.585 | 1.364 | 1.2551 | €103.32 | €193.66 |
Default values: Annex I to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621 as replaced by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1740, Viet Nam table, total emissions (direct emissions only for steel). Mark-up: 10% for 2026, 30% for 2030. Benchmarks: Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2620, point 5.3, Column B, on the blast furnace route that the Viet Nam rows indicate. Certificates = default plus mark-up minus CBAM factor (97.5% for 2026, 51.5% for 2030) × cross-sectoral correction factor (100%) × benchmark. The 2030 column holds the price and the benchmark constant; updated benchmarks are foreseen for goods imported from 2027.
On default values, hot-rolled flat steel from Vietnam costs €102.84 per tonne for 2026 imports and €193.41 for 2030 imports at a constant €82.32 per tonne CO₂e.
For context, the EU imported hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) from Viet Nam in 2025 at an average statistical value of about €540 per tonne at the EU border (Eurostat Comext: €219.3 million for 406 thousand tonnes, this site's calculation).
The 2030 default-value cost is about 36% of that value before any rise in the certificate price.
EAF scrap-based producers face materially lower exposure only where they report verified actual emissions; on default values their steel is charged at the same blast furnace default.
Vietnamese steel producers with access to domestic scrap supply and the capital to invest in EAF capacity have a structural long-term advantage under CBAM that BF-BOF-dependent competitors do not.
For a complete overview of how the steel sector under CBAM is assessed, including CN codes, embedded emissions calculation methods, and default values from Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621 and benchmark values from Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2620, the sector guide on this site covers the full technical framework.
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What Compliance Steps Do Vietnamese Exporters Need to Take?
Vietnamese steel exporters have no direct legal obligation under CBAM. The legal obligation falls entirely on the EU importer.
However, commercial pressure transfers effective compliance responsibility to exporters through two mechanisms: EU importers need verified actual emissions data to avoid punitive default values, and importers with elevated circumvention risk exposure from Vietnamese supply chains need robust origin and production documentation to defend their compliance position.
The four compliance steps most relevant for Vietnamese steel exporters are listed below.
- Establish a production-level monitoring plan that tracks direct CO₂ emissions per tonne of crude steel, aligned with the methodology in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2547, covering all energy inputs, process emissions, and calculation formulas for the specific production route used
- Engage an accredited third-party verifier to conduct a physical site visit ahead of the September 30, 2027 first declaration deadline; as of November 12, 2026 seven verification bodies are documented as accredited by five national accreditation bodies (ESYD in Greece, Accredia in Italy, Swedac in Sweden, RvA in the Netherlands and BELAC in Belgium), none of them is established in Vietnam, and the Commission's official list of accredited verifiers is still unpublished
- Prepare origin documentation that demonstrates genuine domestic production: input material sourcing records, transformation records showing the production processes applied at the Vietnamese installation, and value-addition evidence that distinguishes genuine manufacturing from minor processing operations
- Coordinate with EU importers on the documentation format required by the CBAM Registry, including the installation-level reporting structure and the data fields needed for the importer's annual CBAM declaration due by September 30, 2027
The verifier capacity constraint is a practical risk for Vietnamese producers. Only national accreditation bodies of EU Member States accredit CBAM verifiers, and seven accept third-country applicants according to the Commission's state-of-play table of October 21, 2026: COFRAC, ESYD, Accredia, RvA, PCA, SNAS and Swedac.
Accredited verifiers must physically visit the production installation in the first verification year, and verification vendors quote approximately €5,000 to €50,000 per installation, a market estimate and not a Commission figure. Producers that want help securing verifier capacity or preparing the data can compare the named firms in the directory of CBAM consultants in Vietnam.
Vietnamese installations that delay engaging verifiers risk being unable to secure a qualified verifier before the first declaration cycle closes, forcing reliance on default values with a 10% mark-up in 2026 under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621.
Producers that need outside help with these steps can compare eight named providers that state a CBAM offering for Vietnamese exporters in the directory of CBAM consultants in Vietnam.
Does Vietnam's Carbon Market Qualify for the Article 9 Deduction?
The Article 9 deduction question remains unresolved for Vietnam as of October 12, 2026: no third-country carbon price is formally recognized, and the implementing rules are still a draft. A deduction requires a carbon price that is "effectively paid" for the declared embedded emissions, with any rebate or other compensation taken into account (Article 9(1)).
Vietnam's ETS, in a pilot phase since August 2025 that covers 25 iron and steel facilities, allocates allowances free of charge through 2028. Three conditions must be met before a Vietnamese steel producer can benefit from the Article 9 deduction pathway.
- The Commission must adopt the implementing regulation governing recognition of third-country carbon prices, published in draft on 13 May 2026 with public feedback closed 10 June 2026 and no adoption confirmed as of October 12, 2026, and the Vietnamese scheme must fall within what the final rules recognize; neither has occurred
- The carbon price paid by Vietnamese steelmakers must be documented at the installation level and shown to be "effectively paid" rather than nominal
- The EU importer must claim the reduction in its CBAM declaration, supported by documentation from the Vietnamese producer that an independent person has certified
Non-EU exporter obligations and the strategic pathway toward compliance are covered in detail at the non-EU exporter obligations section of this site, which addresses how exporters from countries with emerging carbon pricing schemes position themselves for Article 9 recognition.
How Does Vietnam's Circumvention Risk Compare to Other CBAM Countries?
The Commission publishes no country-by-country circumvention risk classification, and this site found no Commission document that rates Vietnam as of October 12, 2026.
The risk discussed for Vietnam is structural: mills that re-roll or coat imported hot-rolled coil must document the origin and embedded emissions of that precursor, and their EU importers must be able to show genuine processing.
Vietnam and Indonesia are origins of similar size: the EU imported 2.94 million tonnes of CBAM-covered iron and steel goods of Chapters 72 and 73 from Viet Nam in 2025 and 3.16 million tonnes from Indonesia (Eurostat Comext, 2025).
One practical difference between the two is that Vietnam's pilot ETS covers 25 iron and steel facilities, creating an institutional framework for emissions tracking. Indonesia's mandatory ETS covers power generation only. The Vietnamese ETS creates at least the precondition for installation-level monitoring data that can support a circumvention defense.
Two Boolean questions arise frequently from EU importers sourcing Vietnamese steel.
Does Buying from a Vietnamese Mill Automatically Trigger Anti-Circumvention Review?
Purchasing from a Vietnamese mill does not trigger an anti-circumvention investigation. Under Article 27, the Commission investigates a claim of circumvention where it receives a substantiated notification or decides on its own initiative that an investigation is necessary, and it concludes the investigation within nine months. Importers who hold origin documentation and production records for the mill and its precursors are positioned to answer questions from customs or competent authorities.
Can Vietnamese Steel Exporters Use Default Values to Avoid Verification Costs?
Default values are available, but their financial penalty has grown. Vietnam's default for hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) is 2.350 tCO₂e/t before mark-up under Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2621 as corrected by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1740, and the mark-up is 10% in 2026, rising to 20% in 2027 and 30% from 2028 onward. A Vietnamese BF-BOF producer with actual emissions below the default value pays more in CBAM costs under defaults than under verified actual emissions. The business case for verification strengthens materially from 2027 as the mark-up escalates.
What Does the Vietnam Steel Association Say About CBAM Pressure?
Vietnam's own steel industry body now publicly identifies CBAM as a competitiveness risk. In a statement reported on 16 July 2026, the Vietnam Steel Association (VSA) said Vietnam produced 14.8 million tonnes of crude steel in the first half of 2026, up 21.2% year-on-year, and warned that exports face mounting pressure from two directions: US Section 232 tariffs and the EU CBAM. The VSA stated that failure to modernize production, cut emissions, and provide transparent carbon reporting could undermine the competitiveness of Vietnamese steel.
The association projects 27 million tonnes of crude steel production for 2026, contingent on green-technology investment. That framing is significant for CBAM planning: the industry body itself now ties Vietnam's production growth outlook to the same decarbonization and carbon-reporting investments that determine CBAM cost exposure.
The VSA's call for transparent carbon reporting points in the same direction as the compliance steps outlined above, where verified actual emissions data is the mechanism that separates efficient producers from punitive default values, and its modernization warning mirrors the cost acceleration through 2030 shown in the financial exposure table.
What Is the Strategic Outlook for Vietnamese Steel Under CBAM?
The strategic outlook for Vietnamese steel under CBAM involves three intersecting developments: the ongoing ETS maturation, the downstream expansion proposal under COM(2025)989, and the competitive pressure from high-carbon-intensity competitors that gives Vietnam's EAF-capable producers a relative advantage.
The downstream expansion proposal, if adopted, would extend CBAM coverage from approximately 2028 to include downstream products, such as automotive components, mechanical engineering parts, and construction materials that incorporate steel as a primary input. Vietnamese exporters of steel-containing finished goods that currently fall outside CBAM scope would face new obligations under this expansion.
The proposal has advanced through both co-legislators' first positions: the Council adopted its general approach on 12 June 2026, widening the Commission's original product list to roughly 200 additional steel- and aluminium-containing items, and the European Parliament's ENVI committee adopted its own position on 6 July 2026, extending scope further to an estimated 457 downstream products with tighter anti-circumvention rules.
Parliament's plenary adopted its first-reading negotiating mandate on 15 September 2026 by 464 votes to 50 with 159 abstentions.
The first trilogue with the Council on October 20, 2026 ended without an overall agreement (press reports), with aluminium de minimis, metal scrap, online platforms and global default values sent to technical work; a second trilogue is reported for November 30, 2026.
The proposal, with a proposed application date of 1 January 2028, is not law as of October 23, 2026.
Vietnam's ETS maturation timeline matters for the Article 9 deduction pathway. If the Vietnamese ETS establishes a credible, effectively enforced carbon price at or above approximately €10 per tonne CO₂ and the Article 9 rules recognize it before 2028, Vietnamese steel producers gain a partial offset against CBAM costs that improves their competitive position relative to Chinese and Indonesian competitors without recognized carbon pricing schemes.
Developing an exporter decarbonization strategy that accounts for the 2028–2030 cost acceleration is the most time-sensitive planning action for Vietnamese steelmakers with EU customer relationships.
The 2026 cost is already material on default values, at €102.84 per tonne of hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) at €82.32; the 2030 figure of €193.41 at the same price requires capital investment decisions that cannot be deferred until the cost materializes.
How Does the CBAM Default Value Mark-Up Schedule Affect Vietnamese Producers?
The CBAM default values system applies a progressive mark-up to exporters who do not provide verified actual emissions data. For Vietnamese steel producers, the three-stage escalation over 2026, 2027, and from 2028 onward creates increasing financial incentive to invest in monitoring, verification, and actual emissions reporting rather than relying on defaults.
What Is the Role of the Article 9 Carbon Price Deduction for Vietnam?
The Article 9 carbon price deduction mechanism provides a dollar-for-dollar offset of the carbon price "effectively paid" in the country of origin against the CBAM certificate obligation. For Vietnam, this deduction remains a future potential instrument rather than an available current mechanism, contingent on the adoption of the implementing rules and on a carbon price that producers effectively pay. Where default values are used, a reduction can be claimed only by reference to yearly default carbon prices that the Commission may set from 2027 (Article 9(4)).
How Should EU Importers Manage Vietnamese Supply Chain Circumvention Risk?
EU importers manage Vietnamese supply chain risk most effectively by requiring production-level documentation from Vietnamese suppliers as a contractual condition. The CBAM anti-circumvention rules article on this site details the evidentiary standards that enforcement authorities apply in anti-circumvention investigations, including the documentation requirements that distinguish genuine Vietnamese production from origin-reclassification processing.