CBAM Anti-Circumvention Rules: What Article 27 Covers and How It Is Enforced

CBAM anti-circumvention rules: Article 27 defines circumvention by an economic justification test and names two practices.

Page contents
Diagram of the Article 27 test: a trade pattern change with no justification but avoiding CBAM. Slightly modified goods can be added to Annex I; imports split below 50 t are disregarded. The Commission monitors, receives notices, investigates.

CBAM circumvention is defined in Article 27 of Regulation (EU) 2023/956 by a test of economic justification, and the article names two practices as examples: slightly modifying goods so that they leave the Annex I list, and artificially splitting imports to stay under the 50-tonne threshold. The list is open ("may consist of, but is not limited to").

Misdeclaring the country of origin is not one of the listed practices; it is a matter for customs law. This article explains what Article 27 says, how the Commission monitors and investigates, what Article 25a adds for the threshold, and what the pending proposal COM(2025)989 would change.

For a complete grounding in the broader regulatory framework, the EU CBAM guide covers all six covered sectors and the certificate mechanism in full.

What Article 27 Defines as Circumvention

Article 27(2) defines practices of circumvention as "a change in the pattern of trade in goods, which stems from a practice, process or work, for which there is insufficient due cause or economic justification other than to avoid, wholly or partially, any of the obligations laid down in this Regulation".

The definition has three parts: a change in the pattern of trade, a practice behind it, and the absence of a sufficient reason other than avoiding CBAM obligations.

Article 27 does not work as a list of offences with a penalty attached to each. It obliges the Commission to act against circumvention "based on relevant and objective data" (Article 27(1)), to monitor, to investigate, and, for one of the two named practices, to extend Annex I. The two named practices are described below.

Slightly Modifying Goods (Article 27(2)(a))

The first named practice is "slightly modifying the goods concerned to make those goods fall under CN codes which are not listed in Annex I, except where the modification alters their essential characteristics". The test is therefore whether the modification changes the essential characteristics of the good, not how much value it adds.

An example shows the pattern. Hot-rolled steel coil is a CBAM good. If it is cut or stamped into a simple part classified under a machinery or vehicle heading that Annex I does not list, the importer no longer needs certificates for it.

Where the only reason for the step is to leave Annex I and the part is still essentially the same steel, the practice falls under point (a). Steel tubes and pipes offer no such route, because headings 7304 to 7306 are in Annex I.

Article 27(6) is the remedy. Where the Commission has sufficient reasons to believe that this practice is occurring in one or more member states by way of an established pattern, it is empowered to adopt delegated acts that add the slightly modified products to Annex I. No such delegated act had amended Annex I as of November 4, 2026.

Artificially Splitting Imports (Article 27(2)(b))

The second named practice, inserted by Regulation (EU) 2025/2083, is "artificially splitting imports, including via non-genuine arrangements, to avoid exceeding the single mass-based threshold". That threshold is the 50-tonne de minimis exemption of Article 2a (Annex VII, point 1).

It counts the net mass of all CBAM goods per importer and per calendar year, across all CN codes and origins, never covers electricity or hydrogen, and must be declared in the customs declaration.

Splitting one importer's volume into smaller consignments achieves nothing, because the threshold is annual and per importer. The practice the provision targets is splitting between importers: dividing a 90-tonne annual volume between two importing entities of 45 tonnes each, with no valid commercial reason for the split.

Article 25a(4) gives the competent authority the tool. To decide whether an importer has exceeded the threshold, the authority disregards a practice or arrangement that was put in place "for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of falling below the single mass-based threshold" and that is non-genuine.

An arrangement is non-genuine where it cannot be considered to have been put in place for valid commercial reasons related to the importer's economic activity. An importer found to have used one is considered to have been involved in a serious infringement.

What Article 27 Does Not List: Declared Origin

Article 27(2) does not name the misdeclaration of origin or the routing of goods through another country. The country of origin of a CBAM good is determined under the non-preferential rules of origin of the Union Customs Code, not by the country of the last shipment.

A Chinese steel product shipped through Malaysia does not acquire Malaysian origin unless the processing in Malaysia meets those rules. A false origin declaration is a customs infringement first, and it leads to a wrong CBAM declaration second.

Origin matters for CBAM cost because default values are set per country. The pending proposal COM(2025)989 would add a third named practice to Article 27(2): "artificially adjusting the supply chains to make the goods benefit from lower default values". As of November 4, 2026 that is a proposal, not law.

A related but distinct concern is the CBAM scrap loophole, where declared scrap content lowers embedded emissions because scrap inputs carry zero embedded emissions under the current rules.

Article 27 and Article 25a at a Glance

The table below sets out the two practices named in Article 27(2), the related threshold rule in Article 25a, and what follows from each.

Provision Practice Test Consequence
Article 27(2)(a) Slightly modifying goods so that they fall under CN codes not listed in Annex I Whether the modification alters the essential characteristics of the goods Delegated act adding the modified products to Annex I (Article 27(6))
Article 27(2)(b) Artificially splitting imports, including via non-genuine arrangements, to avoid exceeding the 50-tonne threshold Insufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding obligations Commission monitoring and investigation (Article 27(3) to (5))
Article 25a(4) Non-genuine practice or arrangement with the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of falling below the threshold No valid commercial reasons related to the importer's economic activity Arrangement disregarded; serious infringement; Article 26(2a) penalty where the threshold is exceeded

How the Commission Monitors and Investigates

Article 27 sets out three procedural steps, monitoring and investigation by the Commission and notification by member states and affected parties, and Articles 25 and 25a supply the data.

Monitoring. The Commission monitors the situation at Union level continuously to identify circumvention, including by market surveillance or on the basis of any relevant source of information, such as submissions and reporting from civil society organisations (Article 27(3)).

Notification. A member state, or any party affected by or benefiting from a circumvention practice, may notify the Commission. Other interested parties, such as environmental organisations, may do so where they find concrete evidence (Article 27(4)). A notification states its reasons and includes data and statistics that support the claim (Article 27(5)).

Investigation. The Commission opens an investigation where a notification meets those requirements or where it decides itself that one is necessary. It may be assisted by competent authorities and customs authorities, and it concludes the investigation within nine months from the date of notification (Article 27(5)).

The data comes from customs. Under Article 25(2), customs authorities communicate to the Commission, periodically and automatically, the EORI number of the importer or declarant, the CBAM account number, the eight-digit CN code, the quantity, the country of origin, the date of the customs declaration and the customs procedure. The Commission cross-checks that information with the CBAM Registry for each declarant (Article 25(3)).

For the 50-tonne threshold, Article 25a adds a standing check. The Commission monitors imports against the threshold and exchanges with competent authorities a list of importers that exceed 90% of it (Article 25a(1)).

At least once a year it identifies risk factors and points for attention and communicates them to the competent authorities and, where relevant, customs (Article 25a(5)).

As of November 4, 2026 the Commission's CBAM pages show no list of countries, trade routes or products under circumvention investigation, and its legislation page lists no delegated act under Article 27(6).

Why Declared Origin Changes the Cost: Two Illustrations

The two comparisons below are illustrations by this site of how country-specific default values make the declared origin matter. They are computed from Annex I to IR (EU) 2025/2621, as replaced by IR (EU) 2026/1740, and they are not a list of cases the Commission has named.

Good (CN code) Origin Default value (tCO₂e per tonne) 2026 cost per tonne at €82.32
Hot-rolled flat steel (7208) China 3.187 €178.63
Hot-rolled flat steel (7208) Viet Nam 2.350 €102.84
Unwrought aluminium (7601) Russian Federation 2.160 €81.38
Unwrought aluminium (7601) Türkiye 1.700 €39.73

Each cost is the default plus the 10% mark-up for 2026, less the free allocation adjustment (CBAM factor 97.5% × Column B benchmark of 1.370 for heading 7208 and 1.423 for primary aluminium), at the official Q3 2026 price. The aluminium defaults cover direct emissions only.

A difference of €75.79 per tonne of hot-rolled steel, or €41.65 per tonne of unwrought aluminium, is the incentive that the proposed Article 27(2)(c) addresses. Whether steel processed in a second country, or aluminium remelted there, acquires that country's origin is decided under customs origin rules, case by case.

No Article 9 deduction applies whichever origin is declared: no country's carbon price is recognised as of November 4, 2026, and Türkiye's pilot emissions trading system allocates 100% of allowances for free.

Penalties for Unauthorized Importing

Article 27 sets no penalty of its own. The financial consequences run through Article 26. A person other than an authorized declarant that introduces goods without complying with the regulation pays three to five times the Article 26(1) penalty (Article 26(2)), and the same applies to an importer without the status that exceeds the 50-tonne threshold (Article 26(2a)).

Article 26(1) applies the EU ETS excess emissions penalty of €100 per tonne CO₂e, increased by inflation indexation, so the Article 26(2) range is €300 to €500 before indexation for each certificate not surrendered.

A concrete example illustrates the exposure. An importer brings in 500 tonnes of Turkish semi-finished steel (CN 7207 11 14) in 2026 without CBAM authorization. Under Article 26(4a), the authority calculates the certificates from net mass and default values, taking the free allocation adjustment into account.

The default of 2.310 tCO₂e per tonne plus the 10% mark-up is 2.541; less 0.975 × 1.364 = 1.3299, that leaves 1.2111 certificates per tonne, or about 606 certificates.

The penalty on those certificates is about €181,700 at three times and about €302,800 at five times, before indexation. Under Article 26(2a), payment releases an importer that exceeded the 50-tonne threshold without the status from the obligation to submit a declaration and surrender certificates for those imports. It does not authorize later imports.

An authorized declarant that understates emissions or misstates origin faces the Article 26(1) penalty (€100 per tonne CO₂e before indexation) for each certificate not surrendered, and still owes the certificates (Article 26(3)).

Serious or repeated infringements are also a ground for revoking the status (Article 17(8)). A person that imports after revocation is no longer an authorized declarant, so Article 26(2) applies.

The full penalty framework is detailed in the CBAM penalties article.

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How the Regulation Draws the Line

Two tests draw the line between legitimate trade decisions and circumvention, and they are worded differently.

The Article 27(2) test asks whether there is "insufficient due cause or economic justification" for the practice other than avoiding CBAM obligations. A decision with a sufficient economic reason of its own is outside the definition, even where it also lowers CBAM cost.

A supplier that moves production from China to Viet Nam for cost or labor reasons, whose goods obtain Vietnamese origin under customs rules, is not circumventing CBAM. The emissions of the Vietnamese production process, or the Viet Nam default values, then apply.

The Article 25a(4) test applies only to the 50-tonne threshold. It asks whether an arrangement was put in place for "the main purpose or one of the main purposes" of falling below the threshold and whether it is non-genuine, taking all relevant facts and circumstances into account.

Neither test comes with a numeric safe harbour. As of November 4, 2026 no delegated act under Article 27(6) has been adopted, and this site has found no published Commission decision applying Article 27 to a concrete case.

Importers that want to be able to show economic justification should keep the commercial record of each sourcing and processing decision.

How Circumvention Interacts with CBAM Verification

Circumvention and verification failures can overlap. Where goods are declared with actual emissions, the verification report relates to the installation named in the declaration. If the emission-intensive production took place at a different installation, the verified data does not describe the goods.

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/2546 requires a physical site visit in the first year in which an installation is subject to verification (Article 2).

A plant that received hot-rolled coil from another producer and performed light processing cannot supply verified data for the coil itself: actual values for a purchased precursor count only when they come from a verification report on the installation that produced it. Otherwise default values apply to the precursor.

COM(2025)989 would add an express evidence rule here. Its proposed Article 19(2a) would let the Commission or the competent authority, when reviewing a declaration based on actual emissions, request evidence that the goods were produced at the installation named in the declaration. The CBAM verification article covers the site visit rules and the verification report.

What COM(2025)989 Would Change: A Third Practice and Article 27a

COM(2025)989, published December 17, 2025, would amend the anti-circumvention chapter in two ways. It would add point (c) to Article 27(2), covering supply chains artificially adjusted so that goods benefit from lower default values. It would also insert a new Article 27a, headed "Serious and unforeseen circumstances".

Article 27a is not an anti-circumvention rule. It would empower the Commission to adopt delegated acts removing a good from Annex I where it considers that the inclusion of that good "causes severe harm to the Union internal market due to serious and unforeseen circumstances related to the impact on the prices of goods", until those circumstances have passed. The proposal text sets no quantitative threshold for "severe harm".

The proposal has advanced through the legislative process since publication. The Council adopted its general approach on June 12, 2026, and the European Parliament adopted its first-reading negotiating mandate on September 15, 2026 (464 for, 50 against, 159 abstentions).

Parliament's mandate deletes this safety valve and replaces it with sector support funded from CBAM revenue, and it applies default values where circumvention is established.

The first trilogue on October 20, 2026 ended without an overall agreement (press reports) and sent four issues to technical work: an aluminium de minimis, metal scrap, online platforms and global default values.

A second trilogue is reported for November 30, 2026, and the stated target is an agreement before the end of 2026 so that the wider package can apply from January 1, 2028. Until then the file remains a proposal.

What the Downstream Expansion Means for Circumvention Risk

The proposed downstream scope expansion in COM(2025)989 would bring steel- and aluminium-intensive downstream products into Annex I from January 2028. The Commission's press release counted about 180 products.

The Council's general approach of June 12, 2026 (document 10423/26) keeps the Commission's table and adds 202 eight-digit codes, minus three entries, just over 300 in all by cbamguide.com's count; the "about 200" reported by EUROFER and Mayer Brown refers to the added codes.

Parliament's mandate of September 15, 2026 covers an estimated 457 products by trade-press count. The CBAM downstream product list compares the three positions on CN code coverage.

The expansion addresses the slight-modification pathway by a different route than Article 27(6): it lists downstream products in advance, so that processing a covered good into one of them no longer takes it out of scope.

If adopted, a steel tube (covered today) could not be avoided by importing a listed component made from that tube.

The CBAM regulation (EU) 2023/956 article covers the full legislative history from the original 2023 text through the Omnibus amendments and the current COM(2025)989 proposal.

The Contextual Border: CBAM Circumvention Within the WTO Framework

CBAM anti-circumvention rules operate within an international trade law framework that is itself contested. In WTO dispute DS639, Russia requested consultations on May 12, 2025, and the Dispute Settlement Body established a panel on September 25, 2026.

The dispute covers the CBAM package and Russia's claim that free EU ETS allocation is a prohibited export subsidy.

The WTO and CBAM article covers the DS639 dispute timeline and the enforceability gap created by the non-functional WTO Appellate Body.


How Do Circumvention Rules Apply to Countries With Low CBAM Exposure?

Countries with low embedded emissions have less financial incentive to circumvent CBAM, but the anti-circumvention rules apply equally regardless of the country of origin. The obligation does not scale in simple proportion to emissions, because a fixed free allocation adjustment is deducted first. On 2026 default values at the official Q3 2026 price of €82.32, hot-rolled flat steel (CN 7208) costs €80.20 per tonne from Japan (default 2.100 tCO₂e) and €277.60 from India (default 4.280), with a 10% mark-up, a benchmark of 1.370 and a CBAM factor of 97.5%.

The legal test is identical for both. The incentive to circumvent grows with the cost difference between the declared and the true position.

Does the De Minimis Threshold Apply Differently for Anti-Circumvention Purposes?

The 50-tonne annual de minimis threshold under Article 2a applies per importer per calendar year, aggregated across all CBAM goods. Article 27(2)(b) names artificially splitting imports to avoid exceeding it as a practice of circumvention. Under Article 25a(4), the competent authority disregards a non-genuine arrangement whose main purpose, or one of whose main purposes, is to fall below the threshold, and treats the importer as involved in a serious infringement. The regulation sets no level of affiliation between importers that triggers this; the test is whether the arrangement has valid commercial reasons related to the importer's economic activity. The CBAM de minimis threshold article covers the exemption and its exclusions for electricity and hydrogen.

Is Processing in a Third Country Always a Circumvention Risk?

Processing in a third country is not in itself circumvention. Article 27(2)(a) covers only slight modification that moves goods to a CN code outside Annex I without altering their essential characteristics, and the general test is whether the practice has sufficient due cause or economic justification other than avoiding CBAM obligations. Whether the processing changes the country of origin is a separate question, decided under the origin rules of the Union Customs Code. Importers with third-country supply chains protect themselves by documenting the commercial reason for each production stage, keeping evidence of the processing, and tracing embedded emissions back to the installation that produced each precursor.

Can an EU Importer Be Liable for Circumvention by Their Supplier?

An EU importer bears direct legal liability under CBAM regardless of whether the circumvention was arranged by the supplier. The authorized CBAM declarant is responsible for the accuracy of the CBAM declaration, including the declared country of origin and the declared embedded emissions.

If a supplier provides fraudulent origin certificates or emissions data, the declarant's liability under Article 26 is not automatically extinguished. Article 26(1a) lets the competent authority reduce the penalty where the shortfall results from incorrect information provided by an operator, a verifier or the independent person certifying carbon price documentation, but the missing certificates must still be surrendered (Article 26(3)). This places a premium on supply chain due diligence: importers should check supplier claims on origin and emissions independently.

Are Vietnam and Turkey Specifically Named in the Regulation as Circumvention Risks?

No. Regulation (EU) 2023/956 names no country as a circumvention risk, and Article 27 applies to goods of every origin. As of November 4, 2026 the Commission's CBAM pages show no list of countries or trade routes under investigation for circumvention. The CBAM Vietnam analysis and the CBAM Turkey analysis cover the default values and trade position of those two origins.

Does Circumvention Affect Access to the Article 9 Carbon Price Deduction?

A wrong origin declaration cannot create an Article 9 deduction. Article 9(1) allows a reduction only for a carbon price that has been "effectively paid" in a third country for the declared embedded emissions, so the price must have been paid on the emissions of the installation that produced the goods. If Chinese-produced steel enters the EU with Vietnamese origin documentation, a carbon price in Viet Nam was not paid on those emissions.

China's national ETS has covered steel since the work plan of March 20, 2025, but allowances are allocated free of charge, and no country's carbon price is recognised under Article 9 as of November 4, 2026, so no deduction would apply in any case for Chinese steel.


Data sources: Regulation (EU) 2023/956 · Regulation (EU) 2025/2083 (Omnibus) · IR 2025/2621 · EU ETS data via EEX. Not legal advice.